Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 41
Issue 2 Winter 2010

Article 8

2010

Joint Infringement after BMC: The Demise of
Process Patents
Stacie L. Greskowiak
Loyola University Chicago, School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Stacie L. Greskowiak, Joint Infringement after BMC: The Demise of Process Patents, 41 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 351 (2010).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol41/iss2/8

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

Joint Infringement After BMC: The Demise of
Process Patents
Stacie L. Greskowiak*
"The patent system.., added the fuel of interest to the fire of
genius." - Abraham Lincoln1
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a moment when inspiration strikes in an otherwise average
life-it can be described as none other than a "flash of genius."2 When
innovation moves into the larger culture, it takes on a life-and
commercial possibilities-of its own. 3 These flashes of genius have
cured polio, 4 created weapons of mass destruction, 5 and allowed
humans to fly. 6 To protect these inventions, the patent system was
7
born.
The power of the patent system and the critical protection it affords
inventors is illustrated by the infamous story of Bob Kearns. 8 After a
rogue champagne cork nearly blinded Kearns, 9 he began thinking about
.

J.D., Loyola University Chicago, expected May 2010. I would like to thank my family
and
friends, who have always given their endless support and feign interest when I am moved to tears
about windshield wiper patents. I would like to offer special thanks to Paul Vickrey and Cynthia
Ho, who gave me the opportunity and inspiration to make this Article possible.
1. Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States of America, Lecture on Discoveries,
Inventions, and Improvements (Feb. 22, 1860).
2. In 1941, the Supreme Court stated that, in order to be patentable, a "new device, however
useful it may be, must reveal the flash of creative genius not merely the skill of the calling."
Cuno Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941). However, the "flash of
genius" requirement for patentability was expressly overturned by the Court in 1966 in Graham
v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City. 383 U.S. 1, 16 n.7 (1966) ("Rather than establishing a more
exacting standard, Cuno merely rhetorically restated the requirement that the subject matter
sought to be patented must be beyond the skill of the calling.").
3.

JOHN SEABROOK, FLASH OF GENIUS AND OTHER TRUE STORIES OF INVENTION (St.

Martin's Griffin 2008).
4. Benzyl Alcohol Stabilized Polio Vaccines, U.S. Patent No. 3,097,142 (filed Mar. 30, 1960).
5. Cluster Bomb, U.S. Patent No. 2,809,583 (filed Dec. 4, 1952).
6. Airplane Wing, U.S. Patent No. 1,691,942 (filed Sept. 12, 1927).
7. See infra Part II.A (discussing patents generally).
8. See SEABROOK, supra note 3, at 1-31.
9. Fortunately, Bob blinked before the champagne cork could render him sightless. Id. at 7.
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the functionality of blinking.' 0 When driving on a rainy night some
time later, inspiration struck: why couldn't a wiper work more like an
eyelid? l" Applying the principles of blinking to a windshield wiper, the
intermittent windshield wiper was born. 12 Kearns filed his first patent
application in 1964 and was granted a patent in 1967.13
Kearns offered his invention to Ford, who promised him a contract if
he would disclose the engineering of the wipers. 14 Although Kearns
obliged, 15 he was dismissed from the deal without a contract or an
explanation. 16 Ford began selling Kearns's patented wipers a few years
later, and the rest of the principal automobile manufacturers followed
suit. 17 Within ten years Ford had sold 20.6 million cars with Kearns's
18
patented wipers, with profits calculated at $557 million.
Kearns filed a patent infringement suit against Ford, 19 which quickly
consumed all of his time and money. 20 Kearns refused to settle upon

10. John Monaghan, Inventor's Ordeal; A New Film Tells the Story of Detroiter Robert
Kearns, Who Fought Automakers to Win Creditfor his Prized Invention: Intermittent Windshield
Wipers, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Sept. 28, 2008, at G1.
11. SEABROOK, supra note 3, at 1.
12. See Curt Wohleber, The Windshield Wiper: Nonstop Ones Made Drivers Crazy. Inventing
a Solution Did the Same to Robert Kearns, INVENTION & TECH. MAG., Summer 2007, available
at http://www.americanheritage.com/articles/magazine/it/2007/l/2007_1 6.shtml.
Prior to
Kearns's invention, windshield wipers operated nonstop at only one speed. The intermittent
windshield wipers Kearns invented operated at a timed speed, like an eye. He could vary the time
the wipers dwelled at the base of the windshield and the speed with which they swept across the
windshield; he had even figured out a way of making the wipers automatically adjust their
interval to the amount of water on the glass. SEABROOK, supra note 3, at 8.
13. SEABROOK, supra note 3, at 15. Kearns was awarded three patents total for his work on
intermittent windshield wipers. See U.S. Patent Nos. 3,351,836 (filed Dec. 1, 1964), 3,602,790
(filed Oct. 18, 1967), and 4,544,870 (filed Sept. 7, 1982).
14. In his book, Seabrook recalls a conversation Kearns had with a Ford supervisor, Roger
Shipman: "Wipers were a safety item, Shipman explained, and the law required disclosure of all
the engineering before Ford could give Kearns a contract. This sounded reasonable to Kearns, so
he explained to the Ford engineers exactly how his intermittent wiper worked." SEABROOK,
supra note 3, at 15.
15. Id. The patented invention had already undergone a long period of testing by Kearns. Id.
at 13. As directed by Ford, Kearns tested the wipers through more than three million cycles in his
homemade basement laboratory. Id. Through this process, Kearns's financial situation was
becoming dire; he had to incur the costs of testing his invention, obtaining a patent, and
supporting his family on meager doctoral fellow wages. Id. at 14.
16. Id. at 15.
17. Id. at 18-19. In 1974 General Motors followed suit, followed by Chrysler in 1977. Id. at
19. Saab, Honda, Volvo, Rolls-Royce, and Mercedes soon followed. Id.
18. Id. Ford sold the intermittent wipers-Kearns's invention-for $37 per set. Id.
19. Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 203 U.S.P.Q. 884 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
20. As one observer put it, because of the lawsuit, Kearns "lost the war in terms of his
personal life." His wife left him, explaining that "Robert expected me to have the same focus he
did, and I just didn't have it." Monaghan, supra note 10.
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principle-he desired justice, not money. 2 1 So twelve years after the
case was filed it proceeded to trial.22 The jury found that Ford had
infringed Kearns's patents and awarded him $5.2 million, equivalent to
about thirty cents a wiper. 2 3 After Kearns had spent $10 million in legal
fees and seventeen years in litigation, the David and Goliath tale had
ended. Kearns had won the battle against the car companies. 24 Since its
conception in 1963, Kearns's invention and ensuing litigation consumed
25
forty-two years of his life.
Kearns's story illustrates the profound power of invention and its
impact on individuals and society alike. 2 6 Innovation highlights the
brilliance in the mundane, illuminating those inventions which would
otherwise be dismissed as a mere detail in everyday life.2 7 Until an
21. Kearns refused Ford's settlement offer of $30 million. "To accept money from Ford
would have been like admitting it was okay for them to do what they did," Kearns said.
SEABROOK, supra note 3, at 28; see also John Seabrook. The Flash of Genius: Bob Kearns and
his Patented Windshield Wiper have been Winning Millions of Dollars in Settlements from the
Auto Industry, and Forcing the Issue of Who Owns an Idea, NEW YORKER, Jan. 11, 1993,
available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/1993/01/11/1993_01
11_038_TNYCARDS_
000363341.
22. SEABROOK, supra note 3, at 27.
23. Id. at 28. Kearns had also filed suit against Chrysler, resulting in an award of $18.72
million, or about ninety cents a wiper. Kearns v. Chrysler Corp., 32 F.3d 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
The compensation Kearns received, for the amounts of thirty and ninety cents per wiper plus
interest, respectively, were a far cry from the $37 per set that Ford had charged consumers. See
supra note 18.
24. Compare Monaghan, supra note 10 (noting that Kearns is somewhat of a local legend in
Detroit for winning his battle with the car companies), with SEABROOK, supra note 3, at 31
(detailing the feelings of hopelessness that still haunt Kearns). While the outcomes of the cases
were viewed as a monumental victory for Kearns and small, private inventors everywhere, Kearns
viewed the outcomes as devastating losses. "The moral is that unlawful conduct does pay," he
said. "I don't see how any of us could go home to our children and say it does not." SEABROOK,
supra note 3, at 31.
25. Kearns's saga is now the subject of the movie Flash of Genius, for which the tagline is
"Corporations have time, money, and power on their sides. All Bob Kearns had was the truth."
See
IMDb:
Internet
Movie
Database,
Flash
of
Genius
(2008),
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1054588 (last visited Sept. 19, 2009); see also FLASH OF GENIUS
(Universal Studios 2008).
26. See Monaghan, supra note 10.
27. The words of Ted Daykin are particularly illustrative of this point. During the Kearns
saga, Daykin was an engineer for Ford. He stated:
You know, a lot of people don't really spend a lot of time thinking about their wipers.
They turn them on, they turn them off, and that's about it. But the fact is, there are
dozens of inventions that go into the way your wipers work. What causes wipers to
complete their wipe cycle when they're turned off midwipe? How, when they have
returned to the base of the windshield, do they park themselves out of the driver's
sight? In the industry, we call that feature "depressed park." How are wipers
synchronized with the wash mechanism-what makes the wiper go on automatically
when you push the washer, and give you two or three wipes? How about the rearwindow wiper? Well, when you talk about that stuff you're talking about the
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invention is launched into the stream of commerce, no one can be
certain of its impact or success. 2 8 However, an inventor is robbed of all
29
control over attaining that success when one infringes his patent.
Most importantly, Kearns's story depicts the critical role the patent
system plays in our society:
the protection and enforcement of
30
intellectual property rights.
While Kearns triumphed by using the judicial system to enforce his
rights, present patent owners no longer have the luxury of knowing the
judiciary will faithfully protect their patent rights.3 ' In 2007, the
Federal Circuit issued a watershed decision in BMC Resources, Inc. v.
Paymentech, L.P. ("BMC"),32 which severely limits the rights of patent
owners by increasing the standard required to prove joint patent
infringement. 3 3 This Note suggests that the standard imposed by the
BMC decision is a failure on the part of the Federal Circuit to protect
and enforce the rights of patent owners because it leaves a glaring
loophole in patent law that is inconsistent with patent precedent and
34
policy.
inventions of windshield-wiper engineers.
SEABROOK, supra note 3, at 10-11.
28. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 304 (The Bellknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 2003)
(discussing the significance of uncertainty of an invention's commercial success on the economic
structure of intellectual property law).
29. An inventor's control of the commercial aspects of their article is eviscerated when they
cannot control the making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing of their invention. See
ROCHELLE C. DREYFUSS & ROBERTA R. KWALL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TRADEMARK, COPYRIGHT, AND PATENT LAW 564 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds.,
2004) (discussing how an inventor will control the economic exploits of the invention when
patent rights are protected as intended).
30. See SEABROOK, supra note 3, at xiv. Writing about Kearns's saga, the author stated that
"I realized that Kearns v. the auto industry was about the nature of invention itself, and about the
federal government's attempts to regulate and legislate 'invention ... "' Id.
31. See, e.g., Kristin E. Gerdelman, Comment, Subsequent Performanceof Process Steps by
Different Entities: Time To Close Another Loophole in U.S. Patent Law, 53 EMORY L.J. 1987
(2004) (describing the decreased judicial enforcement of patent rights in the context of process
patents).
32. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P. (BMC 11), 498 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
33. Patent infringement occurs when one without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, sells, or
imports the patented invention into the United States. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). Joint patent
infringement occurs when the actions of multiple entities without authority combine to make, use,
offer to sell, sell, or import the patented invention into the United States. See Aro Mfg. Co. v.
Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 500 (1964) (recognizing and referencing joint
infringement); see also infra Part V.A (discussing how the "direction or control" standard
diminishes, and in some cases, destroys the exclusive rights of process patent owners because the
patents are particularly susceptible to circumvention and judicial enforcement of rights are
uncertain at best).
34. See infra Part V (discussing the devastating impact that BMC will have on patent owner's
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This Note begins by providing an overview of patent protections,
patent policy, and the evolution of infringement liability in Part H.
Next, Part III discusses the BMC decision by tracking the holdings and
reasoning of the magistrate court, district court, and ultimately, the
Federal Circuit. 36 Part IV then analyzes BMC's "direction or control"
standard for joint infringement and the reasoning behind the novel
37
standard, especially in light of the statutory scheme and patent policy.
Finally, Part V outlines the harmful impact that the BMC holding will
have on the patent system generally and the rights of patent owners
38
individually.
II.BACKGROUND
To appreciate BMC's significance, it is first necessary to understand
the nature of patents, the policies underlying the patent system, and the
development of infringement jurisprudence. 39 Accordingly, this Part
first provides a general overview of patents. 40 Next, it discusses the
policies underlying the patent system 4 1 and provides an overview of
patent infringement. 4 2 Finally, this Part follows the evolution of joint
infringement liability 43 by explaining the two prominent frameworks for
analyzing joint infringement allegations before BMC: the "some

rights).
35. See infra Part II (providing an overview of patents, patent policy, and the evolution of
infringement liability by multiple entities).
36. See infra Part III (discussing the trilogy of BMC opinions, and the reasoning behind each
one).
37. Compare infra Part IV (discussing why the "direction or control" standard is too stringent
a requirement such that it is inconsistent with precedent, policy, and fundamental tort principles,
and illustrating why, at most, "participation and combined action," is required to impose liability
for joint infringement), with Long Truong, After BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P.:
ConspiratorialInfringement as a Means of Holding Joint Infringers Liable, NW. U. L. REV., at
Parts IIl-IV (forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=l 121947 (recognizing that
the "direction or control" standard imposes a loophole in patent protection, yet sets forth a
standard for joint infringement liability that is in fact higher than the "direction or control"
standard because it requires specific intent on the part of all joint infringers in order to impose
liability for joint infringement).
38. Compare infra Part V (discussing the detrimental impact that the BMC "direction or
control" standard has, and will continue to have, on the patent system), with Truong, supra note
37, at Part IV (accepting the "direction or control" standard as workable and attempting to
supplement the standard with the elements of common law civil conspiracy).
39. See generally Part II (providing a background to the BMC decision).
40. See infra Part ll.A (explaining patents generally).
41. See infra Part II.B (discussing U.S. patent policy).
42. See infra Part H.C (explaining patent infringement).
43. See infra Part II.D (illustrating the evolution of joint infringement liability, beginning in
the early 1900s).
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connection" standard 44 and the "participation and combined action"
standard.4 5
A. Patents Generally
As authorized by the United States Constitution, inventors of new
and useful products and methods 46 are granted exclusive rights to their
inventions through the issuance of a patent. 4 7 A patent grants a negative
right. That is, a patentee 4 8 has the right to exclude all others from
making, using, offering to sell, selling, or importing its invention,
although the patent does not authorize the patentee to take any of those
49
actions himself.
50
The claims of a patent define the scope of the right to exclude.
Each claim defines a separate invention that is the exclusive proprietary
interest of the patentee for the duration of the patent. 5 1 Within each
claim, elements are recited that further define and limit the scope of the
44. See infra Part II.E (illustrating the "some connection" standard).
45. See infra Part I.F (discussing the "participation and combined action" standard set forth in
On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., 442 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
46. Patentable subject matter is defined as "any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof" by Section
101 of the U.S. Patent Act. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). Section 102 of the U.S. Patent Act more
specifically delineates the "novelty" requirements of patentability. Id. § 102.
See also
Gerdelman, supra note 31, at 1989-90 (discussing patents generally).
47. Article I of the Constitution grants Congress the power to "promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8.
48. A "patentee" is one who owns title to a patent. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1162 (8th ed.
2004). For purposes of this Article, "patentee" will be used interchangeably with "patent owner."
49. Any person who makes, uses, offers to sell, sells, or imports a patented invention into the
U.S. is liable for infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). Patent law also creates the right to
prevent others from inducing direct infringement, id. § 271(b); the right to prevent domestic
contributory infringements, id. § 271(c); the right to prevent others from selling components for
assembly of the patented invention abroad, id. § 271(f); and the right to prevent others from
importing into the United States articles manufactured with a patented process, id. § 271 (g). This
Article will only examine direct infringement.
A patent does not authorize a patent owner to practice his own invention. See DREYFUSS &
KWALL, supra note 29, at 564 (noting the negative rights conferred to a patentee). For example,
although an inventor might obtain a patent on a new drug to treat a disease, he is not authorized to
make, use, sell, offer to sell, or import the patented drug in the United States until the inventor
meets safety and efficacy standards imposed by the United States Food and Drug Administration.
50. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (requiring that a patentee precisely state the borders of the claimed
invention). The term of patent protection is twenty years from the date the patent application is
filed for most patents filed on or after January 1, 1995. Id. § 154(a)(2). For patents that were
filed prior to January I, 1995, but were in force on that date, the term is seventeen years from the
date of issuance or twenty years from the date of application, whichever is longer. DREYFUSS &
KWALL, supra note 29, at 564.
51. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY'S DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 40 (BNA Books 1991).
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claim. 52 Process claims 53 encompass a series of elemental steps to be
followed in performing the claimed process. 54
As a general
understanding of patents is important for an infringement analysis, it is
equally as important to keep in mind the policies underlying patent
jurisprudence.
B. United States Patent Policy
"A patent, by its very nature, is affected with public interest. '5 5 The
Constitution's patent provision is utilitarian in structure and purpose:
the patent laws are designed to benefit society by increasing the body of
available knowledge in the public domain. 5 6 A patent, however, is an
exception to rules that denounce monopolies 57 and support public
access to free and open markets. 58 Thus, the Framers' willingness to
grant exclusive rights evinces the importance of innovation. 59 Indeed,
the patent system was carefully crafted to balance the interest in
fostering innovation with the interest in avoiding monopolies that stifle
6°
competition.
52. Id.
53. The terms "process claims" and "method claims" are used interchangeably.
54. A patented process is defined as "a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a
given result. it is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed
and reduced to a different state or thing." Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876). The
term "process" was also given a statutory definition, meaning "a process, art or method, and
includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or
material." 35 U.S.C. § 100 (2006).
55. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945).
56. The object and policy of the patent laws are rooted in "the Framers' intent to promote
progress in the useful arts." Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1574 (Fed. Cir.
1987). See also CRAIG A. NARD, DAVID W. BARNES & MICHAEL J. MADISON, THE LAW OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 651-52 (Aspen Publishers 2006) (discussing how fostering innovation
is the primary objective of the patent laws).
57. The Framers were generally suspicious of monopolies. See Letter from James Madison to
Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, 1787-90, at 269,
274-75 (Galliard Hunt ed., 1904). James Madison stated that monopolies are "justly classed
among the greatest nuisances in government . . . Monopolies are sacrifices of the many to the
few." Id. See also Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966) (stating that the
Framers drafted the copyright clause of the Constitution "against the backdrop of the practiceseventually curtailed by Statute of Monopolies--of the Crown in granting monopolies to court
favorites in goods or businesses which had long before been enjoyed by the public").
58. PrecisionInstrument Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. at 816.
59. See Gerdelman, supra note 31, at 1991 (discussing the Framers' fear of monopolies, which
stemmed from the abuse of monopoly power in England).
60. For example, the "inventing around" principle of patent law provides a limitation on the
patent monopoly. See infra note 70 (detailing the "inventing around" principle). The social costs
of providing a monopoly through patents center around the fear of decreasing the economic
welfare. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 28, at 310 (discussing whether patent law is socially
cost-justified).

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 41

The patent system achieves its purpose by providing economic
incentives to invent. 6 1 Exclusive patent rights are inherently and
inextricably intertwined with the economic benefits derived from
market exclusivity; 62 this nexus is the driving force that incentivizes
innovation. The exclusivity of a patent gives the owner an essential
monopoly over the market for its invention, the value of the patent
63
being the economic benefits stemming from the monopoly power.
Patent law is structured to utilize these economic considerations in a
variety of ways. 64 For example, a patent is granted only to the first
inventor, 65 and protects against all independent duplication of the
invention. 66 This provides inventors with economic incentives not only
to invest in cutting-edge innovations, but also to race to be the first to
put such knowledge in the public domain. 67 In addition to the
61. See generally LANDES & POSNER, supra note 28 (illustrating how the United States patent
system provides economic incentives by virtue of the prevention of independent duplication, the
grant of an exclusive yet limited monopoly, and the "inventing around" principle).
62. The exclusivity of a patent allows the patentee to set prices that are in excess of the
marginal cost for the term of the patent. DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 29, at 565. Further,
the patentee's monopoly allows him to obtain an enormous percentage of the market value of his
invention; assuming the patent would depreciate, the percentages would be even higher. LANDES
& POSNER, supra note 28, at 295-96.
63. The monopoly markup of a patent is illustrated in the following economic model: At a
discount rate of 10 percent, the present value of a constant stream of income to be received for
twenty years is 85 percent of the same stream received in perpetuity. Thus, in effect, the patent
statute allows the patentee to realize a maximum of 85 percent of the market value of his
invention. The estimated depreciation rate of the average patent is 6 percent. Plugged into this
formula, the twenty-year patent term would yield a maximum of almost 95 percent of the value of
the patent in perpetuity at a 10 percent discount rate. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 28, at 29697.
64. For example, patent rights are afforded only to applied research, which has immediate
commercial value, as opposed to basic research. Id. at 306-07. Basic research, by definition,
does not have immediate commercial value. The authors discuss how an enormous amount of
basic research is produced every year without the benefit of patentability, and it is instead
incentivized by rewards that involve prestigious academic appointments, lecture fees, grants that
reduce teaching loads, and the prospect of Nobel and other prizes. The government thus limits
intellectual property rights to applied research, in part because basic research has commercial
value only as an input into further applied research activity. Id.
65. Only the first party to conceive of the invention and diligently reduce it to practice is
entitled to a patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
66. Unlike Copyright, which is authorized by the Constitution and is the counterpart of patent
rights, a patent prevents any independent duplication of the invention rather than merely
forbidding copying of it. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) (setting forth conduct which is
deemed patent infringement), with DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 29, at 636 (discussing the
requirements for copyrights protection). Not only will the author of a copyrighted work not
infringe on the copyright of another whose work is exactly the same, but he will also be entitled
to his own copyright protection. In the case of patents, even if another party independently
conceived of the same invention, he would be precluded from making, using, selling, offering to
sell, or importing his own independent invention. DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 29, at 564.
67. A "patent race" is spurred by the "first to invent" principle and the exclusive nature of
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monopoly protection provided to a patent owner, other well-established
principles of patent law further illustrate how it is structured to fulfill its
purpose of incentivizing innovation. The "inventing around" principle
stems from the patentability of an improvement on an invention 68 and
the disclosure requirement, 69 and it provides a patentee's competitor
with economic incentives to use the information disclosed in the patent
to "invent around" and improve upon the invention. 70 Additionally, the
"experimental use" exception to infringement permits limited use of a
71
patented invention to test its qualities or invent around it.
Patent policy has long been afforded the utmost protection, even
decisively trumping concerns of unfair competition laws. 7 2 The
patent rights; market competitors race to be the first to discover and patent some new idea having
commercial potential. DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 29, at 300. The first competitor to reach

the finish line obtains the patent, and with it the full value of the invention, even if he beats his
competitors by only a day. Id. at 301. However, the argument also exists that such a race can
generate costs of invention that exceed the social benefits. See id. (discussing the wasteful
duplication of effort by competing inventors).
The rule precluding any independent duplication of a patented invention has economic
implications, because if patents did not protect against independent duplication, an inventor who
had spent enormous sums to be the first to discover some useful new idea might find himself
unable to recoup his costs because someone else, working independently toward the same goal,
had duplicated his discovery within weeks or months after he had made it. LANDES & POSNER,
supra note 28, at 295-96.
68. One may also obtain a patent on "any new and useful improvement" of a process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
69. A patentee must disclose his invention with such clarity that it would enable a person of
ordinary skill in the art to practice the claimed invention. Id. § 112.
70. Competitors are encouraged to "invent around" the patented invention by achieving the
benefits of the patent without duplicating the particular steps constituting it. LANDES & POSNER,
supra note 28, at 299. The information disclosed in a patent will enable the competitor to
determine the feasibility of inventing around without having to incur the cost of experimenting to
obtain this information. Id. Particularly with pharmaceutical patents, competitors need not incur
the steep research and development expenditures to put their own bioequivalent drug on the
market at the end of the patent term. Analyzing Brand Name and Generic Drug Costs in the U.S.
and Eight Other Countries, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Wharton School at the Univ. of Pa.,

Phila.), Nov. 19, 2003, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=879.
71. See MCCARTHY, supra note 51, at 120-22 (discussing experimental use and the
"inventing around" principle). Experimental use supplements the "inventing around" principle in
that invention often occurs sequentially: the frontiers of knowledge expand more rapidly if one
person's insight can be used as a building block for future developments by another. DREYFUSS
& KWALL, supra note 29, at 766.

72. Patents often legitimize restraints which, in the absence of the intellectual property right,
would be per se violations of the antitrust laws. Robert P. Taylor & Michael J. Higgins,
Innovation and Antitrust, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY/ANTITRUST 1993, at 805, 820 (PLI Pats.,

Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course Handbook Series No. G4-3903, 1993).
However, during 2002 hearings held by the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice
on the conflicts between antitrust and patent law, Robert Pitofsky, the former chairman of the
FTC, and James Rogan, the director of the Patent and Trademark Office, agreed that patent laws
trump antitrust laws. In these hearings Federal Circuit Judge Pauline Newman commented that
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rationale behind these decisions returns to the basic principle that
intellectual property law seeks to enhance the incentives to invest in

new and risky technology. But for such an incentive system to work, all
viable options for commercial exploitation must be available to the
73
patent owner.
C. Patent Infringement
A patentee may exercise its right to exclude others from practicing its
invention by bringing a cause of action for infringement. 74 The crux of
direct infringement lies in the "all elements rule," which requires that an
infringing party practice every element of the invention in order to be
liable for direct infringement. 75 However, in Crowell v. Baker Oil
Tools, an exception to this rule was recognized in the context of process
patents. 76 The exception arises when a party employs another to
perform infringing acts for him. 77 In addition to direct infringement, the
"the public disclosure role of patents is more important than ever." Antitrust: FTC, DOJ Hold
Hearing on Overlap, Conflict, Between Antitrust Enforcement, Patent Law, ELECTRONIC COM. &
L. REP. (Bureau of National Affairs, Arlington, Va.), Feb. 13, 2002, available at 7 BNA ECLR
138.
The Supreme Court and Second Circuit unequivocally upheld the importance of patent policy in
the early 1980s when both decided that patent policy prevailed over antitrust concerns. Robert P.
Taylor, Antitrust Issues in Licensing Intellectual Property Rights, in 47TH ANNUAL ADVANCED
ANTITRUST SEMINAR, at 357, 371-73 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. 14482,
2007). In Dawson v. Rohm & Haas, the Supreme Court went well beyond the issue at hand to
emphasize the fundamental right of a patent owner to "exclude others from profiting by the
patented invention." Dawson v. Rohm & Haas, 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980). In SCM Corp. v.
Xerox Corp., the Second Circuit stated that patent policy seeks to promote the marriage of capital
with new technology to create new enterprises and, as such, depends on the availability of
commercially viable agreements for capturing the value of the new technology. SCM Corp. v.
Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1206 (2d Cir. 1981).
73. SCM Corp., 645 F.2d at 1206.
74. A party is liable for direct infringement when they make, use, sell, offer to sell, or import
the patented invention. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). Causes of action to enforce a patent owner's
right to exclude run the gamut from high profile to absurd. Compare T.F.H. Pubs., Inc. v. Hartz
Mountain Corp., 67 F. App'x. 599 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (patent owner sought to enforce her patent
claiming a chewable, flavored dog toy), with Verdict Form at 6, Saffran v. Boston Scientific
Corp., No. 2-05-CV-547, 2008 WL 2716318 (E.D. Tex. July 9, 2008) (patent owner enforced
patent claiming a heart stent to prevent heart attacks, resulting in a $431.9 million dollar jury
verdict).
75. Prouty v. Draper, 41 U.S. 336, 340 (1842). Prouty v. Draper is the seminal case setting
forth the "all elements" rule, stating that when a "patent ... is for a combination . . . unless it is
proved that the whole combination is substantially used in the defendant's [product], it is not a
violation of the plaintiffs patent." Id. Where the patented invention is a method, direct
infringement occurs only when all the steps of the method are performed. NTP, Inc. v. Research
In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
76. Crowell v. Baker Oil Tools, 143 F.2d 1003 (9th Cir. 1944).
77. In Crowell, the court illustrated "another" as either an agent or an independent contractor,
stating that "[iut is obvious that one may infringe a patent if he employ an agent for that purpose
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legislature has also recognized two causes of action for indirect
infringement: contributory infringement 78 and inducement. 79 Both
causes of action are predicated on a finding of direct infringement; there
80
can be no indirect infringement in the absence of direct infringement.
D. Evolution of PatentInfringement Liability
Since the early twentieth century, courts have recognized the
convergence of property and tort jurisprudence that exists in patent
law. 8 1 In 1908, the Supreme Court held that a patent confers property
rights on a patentee; thus, patent infringement amounts to a tortious
taking of the patentee's property. 82 Under traditional tort theories of
liability, actors are joint tortfeasors under three circumstances: when
two or more persons (1) act in concert to commit a tort, (2) act
independently but cause a single indivisible tortious injury, or (3) share
83
responsibility for a tort because of vicarious liability.
The Supreme Court first recognized and referenced joint
infringement in 1964 in Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top
Replacement Co. 84 In Aro, unlicensed car manufacturers 85 sold cars
with patented convertible tops to purchasers. 8 6 At issue in the case was
or have the offending articles manufactured for him by an independent contractor." Id. at 1004.
It is important to note that an independent contractor is not always considered an agent, and is
only an agent if the employer has a right to control the activities of the contractor. Gen. Bldg.
Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Pa., 458 U.S. 375, 395 (1982).
78. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2006). Contributory infringement of a patent is the act of knowingly
selling or offering to sell a nonstaple component of a patented invention, knowing it to be
especially made or adapted for use in an infringement of such patent. Id.
79. Id. § 271(b). One who actively aids another person in directly infringing a patent is
himself liable for the separate statutory tort of inducement of infringement. Id.; MCCARTHY,
supra note 51, at 157. Although the statute does not require that a person "knowingly" aid and
abet the direct infringement of another, the case law and legislative history require that an actor
have knowledge that the other will in fact directly infringe. MCCARTHY, supra note 51, at 157.
80. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 483 (1964).
81. Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641,648 (1915).
82. Id. "As the exclusive right conferred by the patent was property, and the infringement was
a tortious taking of a part of that property, the normal measure of damages was the value of what
was taken." Id.
83. Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the consequences of their wrongful act.
See infra notes 287-88 (defining and illustrating joint and several liability).
84. Aro Mfg. Co., 377 U.S. at 507.
85. A license is a grant of permission to commit some act that would otherwise be unlawful.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

938 (8th ed. 2004).

In the context of patent law, a licensing

agreement is a contractual agreement whereby the licensee is permitted to make, use, sell, offer to
sell, or import into the United States the patented article or process. Without a license, a
patentee's right to exclude would render an unlicensed user's conduct unlawful. See 35 U.S.C. §
271 (a) (2002) (setting forth the elements of patent infringement).
86. The purchaser's use of the tops was infringing because their use of the tops was not
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the infringement liability of an unlicensed manufacturer of fabric (a
component of the patented invention) used to repair the tops. 8 7 The
Court held that while the component manufacturer could not be liable

for direct infringement, the purchasers' use of the component to repair
the tops constituted direct infringement. 8 8 In concluding that the
purchasers were directly infringing, the Court reasoned that "it has often
and clearly been held that unauthorized use, without more, constitutes
89
infringement."
Just six years later, in Metal Film Co. v. Melton Corp.,90 a district
court held a defendant liable for direct infringement when outside
suppliers performed the first step of the patented process. 9 1 The
defendant arranged for suppliers to complete the first step and then
performed the remaining steps itself.9 2 Notably, the fact that the
defendant did not perform every element of the process itself was
mentioned only in a footnote: "[t]hat defendants chose to have the [first
licensed and unauthorized. Aro Mfg. Co., 377 U.S. at 484. "But with [the car manufacturers]
lacking authority to make and sell, it could be by its sale of the cars confer on the purchasers no
implied license to use, and their use of the patented structures was thus 'without authority' and
infringing under s 271(a)." Id. On the other hand, it is fundamental that a bona fide sale of a
patented article by the patentee or a licensee gives a purchaser an implied license to use the
article, thereby rendering a user immune from infringement liability. United States v. Univis
Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 249 (1942).
87. Aro Mfg. Co., 377 U.S. at 482. In determining whether defendant Aro committed
contributory infringement by manufacturing and selling the infringing product, the court first had
to determine whether the car owners committed direct infringement. Id. at 483. It is likely that in
this case, like many other patent cases, the plaintiff sought damages from the "deep pockets"
defendant manufacturer, rather than any individual user. See id. at 485-86 (discussing case law
which established contributory infringement).
88. Id. at 483. However, had the car manufacturer been licensed, the purchaser's use of the
component to repair the tops would not have been directly infringing, thus precluding the
component manufacturer from liability for contributory infringement. See id. at 484 ("If the
owner's use infringed, so also did his repair of the top-structure, as by replacing the worn-out
fabric component. Where use infringes, repair does also, for it perpetuates the infringing use.").
89. Id. at 484. In determining whether the purchasers committed direct infringement, the
court stated: "[wie think it clear, under § 271(a) of the Patent Code and the entire body of case
law on direct infringement which that section has left intact, that they did." Id. at 483.
90. Metal Film Co. v. Melton Corp., 316 F. Supp. 96, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The patent at issue
was a process of producing non-laminated metalized yarn, which can withstand the processing
and use conditions to which they are subjected, while remaining soft enough to come into contact
with human skin. Id. at 97.
91. Id. at 110. The defendants had outside suppliers perform the first step, by passing a
relatively broad web of flexible, transparent thermoplastic material through a vacuum chamber to
plate one surface thereof with a deposit of metal. Id.
92. Id. Next, the defendant himself would coat the metalized surface with a lacquer, or a
transparent plastic material applied in liquid form. Id. The plastic material becomes a non-tacky
film after it dries, and stretches without flaking off or breaking off when the yarn is subject to
elongation in normal use. Id. Defendants would then slit the plastic-coated metalized web to a
specific yam width. Id.
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step] ... done by outside suppliers does not mitigate their infringement
of the overall process." 9 3 The court did not examine, however, whether
94
the defendants had an agency relationship with the outside suppliers.
Thus, the court's finding of liability implicitly served to expand the
Crowell holding by permitting direct
infringement liability even in the
95
absence of an agency relationship.
In contrast, the Mobil Oil Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co. 9 6 court held
that a seller9 7 was liable for direct infringement when third-party
purchasers performed the last step of the patented process, as opposed
to the first. 98 The patent claimed a step-by-step catalytic process to
chemically change certain compounds, the last step of which was
heating. 9 9 The seller performed all but the heating step, and sold the
compounds to purchasers who heated the compound and completed the
process. 10 0 Although the court agreed that the infringing process was
performed by multiple entities, it found the seller liable for direct
infringement because "it knew at the time it sold each of its
[compounds]" that the heating step would be fully completed by its
customers." 10 1 Reasoning that the "defendant, in effect, made each of
93. See id. at 110 n. 12 (citing Crowell for the proposition that "one may infringe a patent if he
employs an agent for that purpose").
94. Id. at 110. The court provided little analysis on the relationship between the defendant
and the outside suppliers, merely that the third party were "outside suppliers." Id.
95. Gerdelman, supra note 31, at 2007.
Presumably the court viewed [the defendant]'s suppliers as agents--or a logical
extension of that role-but its application of Crowell was an expansion of that holding.
Not only was the patent ... for a process rather than a product, but also it was unclear
that the defendants had an agency relationship with the outside suppliers.
Id.
96. Mobil Oil Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co. (Mobil Oil Corp.), 367 F. Supp. 207 (D. Conn.
1973).
97. Mobil Oil Corp. and Aro Mfg. Co. were opposed with respect to which entity would be
held liable for direct infringement. Compare Mobil Oil Corp., 367 F. Supp. at 211, with Aro
Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 484 (1964). In Mobil Oil Corp., a
seller was liable for direct infringement when purchasers performed the last step of the patented
process. However, in Aro Mfg. Co., the purchasers were liable for direct infringement when the
seller's prior acts made the infringement possible.
98. Mobil Oil Corp. and Metal Film Co. were opposed with respect to the order of the
infringing acts which would result in liability for direct infringement. Compare Mobil Oil Corp.,
367 F. Supp. at 211, with Metal Film Co., 316 F. Supp. at 97. In Mobil Oil Corp., a seller was
liable for direct infringement when third parties performed the last step of the patented process.
However, in Metal Film Co., a seller was liable for direct infringement when a third party
performed thefirst step of the patented process.
99. When the compound was heated, the chemical structure of the compound would change,
thus completing the patented process of changing the chemical structure of the compound. Mobil
Oil Corp., 367 F. Supp. at 218-24.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 253.
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its customers its agent in completing the infringement step," the court,
like its predecessors, adopted an expansive view of "agency" as applied
02
to direct infringement. 1
As such, early case law consistently recognized that direct
infringement of a process may exist even though all the steps are not
performed by one party and no agency relationship exists. More
specifically, courts accepted joint infringement as a viable legal theory.
E. The "Some Connection" Standard
After the creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982,103 a series of
decisions began to require "some connection" between entities that
jointly infringe a patented method. 10 4 The problem of imposing liability
in the case where the action of multiple entities combine to infringe a
process was first expressed by the court in E.L Dupont de Nemours &
Co. v. Monsanto Co. 10 5 The court's analysis distinguished between a
party who sells a product on which it performed the initial steps of a
process, and a completing party who uses the product to complete the
remaining steps of the process. 10 6 The court held the completing party
liable for direct infringement, while the selling party escaped
liability. 10 7 The holding rested on two important considerations: (1) an
actor cannot avoid liability by having another perform part of the
process for it, and (2) relevant case law had never held the selling party
liable for direct infringement. 0 8 Accordingly, a completing party could
not avoid direct infringement liability "by paying [the selling party] to
practice step (a) of the patented process .... "109
The "some connection" language was first set forth in Faroudja
Laboratories, Inc. v. Dwin Electronics, Inc., where a district court

102. Id. Although the court described the purchaser as the defendant's "agent," it clearly was
not referring to agency principles in their ordinary legal sense. In fact, the relationship between
the defendant and the purchaser falls short of what is required to constitute an agency
relationship. See infra note 241 (discussing general agency principles).
103. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created by Congress to achieve
uniformity of precedent in the field of patent law. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub.
L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (codified as amended in scattered sections of Title 28 of the
United States Code). The Federal Circuit was granted exclusive appellate jurisdiction regarding
patent matters. ROBERT L. HARMON, HARMON ON PATENTS: BLACK-LETTER LAW AND
COMMENTARY § 1.12 (BNA 2007).
104. Gerdelman, supra note 31, at 2007-08.
105. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Monsanto Co., 903 F. Supp. 680 (D. Del. 1995).
106. Gerdelman, supra note 31, at 2007-08.
107. E.. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 903 F. Supp. at 733-35.

108. Id. at 735.
109.

Id.
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analyzed the direct infringement liability of multiple actors.110 In
synthesizing previous cases that had assigned direct infringement
liability to one discrete entity, the court concluded that "some
connection" between the different entities whose combined action
infringed the process had justified those findings.I'
Applying general
tort principles, the court went on to state that the entities found liable for
direct infringement "worked in concert" with others to complete the
infringing process.112
Following Faroudja,the Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic AVE Inc. court's
13
infringement analysis applied the "some connection" requirement."
The court specifically examined whether the entities whose combined
action infringed a process had "some connection" to each other. 114 This
case involved a six-step process for producing and using stents. The
seller performed the second step of the process, and physician users
performed the remaining four steps. 1 15 The court found the actors'
connection to be sufficient because the seller provided sample products
to physicians, taught physicians to use the products, and recruited
physicians to test the products. 116 The court held that the "close
relationship" between the parties supported finding that the physicians
117
had directly infringed the process.
The court in Marley Mouldings Ltd. v. Mikron Industries, Inc. also
applied the "some connection" standard, and held that liability for direct

infringement was appropriate when a party contracts out part of the
process and then completes the process itself because "that party,

through its connection with the entity performing only part of the

110. Faroudja Labs., Inc. v. Dwin Elecs., Inc., No. 97-20010 SW, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22987, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 1999).
111. Id. The court stated: "[i]t is true that several district courts have found a party liable for
direct infringement of a process patent even where the various steps included in the patent are
performed by distinct entities. However, these cases indicate that some connection between the
different entities justified that finding." Id. The court incorporated the following two cases into
its analysis of the applicable law: (1)E.L Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Monsanto Co., supra
notes 105-09 and accompanying text, and (2) Metal Film Co. v. Melton Corp., supra notes 90-94
and accompanying text.
112. Faroudja Labs., Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22987, at *17.
113. Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic AVE, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 2d 323, 349 (D. Del. 2002).
114. "To constitute a predicate act of direct infringement of a process claim, either a single
entity must perform every step of the method or, if two or more entities perform different steps of
the method, those entities must have some connection to each other." Id.
115. Id. The second step of the claim required the actor to mount the stent onto a catheter.
However, the seller sold premounted stents so, in practice, the physicians never performed the
second step. Id.
116. Id. at 350.
117. Id.
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process, is in actuality performing the combination of each and every
step of the claimed method." 1'18 Although the court found that there
was a material issue of fact as to whether the completing party had
control over the seller's activities, the "undisputed" connection between
19
the two entities was sufficient to overcome summary judgment."
Furthermore, although the Pay Child Support Online Inc. v. ACS
State & Local Solutions, Inc. court did not use the "some connection"
language, its infringement analysis illustrates the type of connection
necessary for a plaintiff to gain a judgment of infringement as a matter
of law. 120 In Pay Child Support Online, the patented process consisted
of a method of processing payments whereby an employee with
obligations to a third party could make payments through his
employer. 12 1 The court held the company providing the payment
services liable for direct infringement, even though the employers both
initiated the transfer of payment information and transferred the
12 2
payment information.
In sum, cases decided following the Federal Circuit's creation
uniformly held that "some connection" between entities was required
for a finding of direct infringement when multiple entities jointly
infringed a patent. 123 Courts grappled over the degree of closeness
required within "some connection."
Nevertheless, an undisputed
1 24
connection was sufficient to impose liability as a matter of law.
118. Marley Mouldings Ltd. v. Mikron Indus., Inc., No. 02 C 2855, 2003 WL 1989640, at *3
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2003). The court stated that "[a] party cannot avoid direct infringement merely
by having another entity perform one or more of the required steps when that party is connected
with the entity performing one or more of the required steps." Id.
119. Id. Although the parties disputed the degree of the involvement between the two entities
in performing the first two steps of the process, it was undisputed that the completing entity had
purchased the "made to order" product from the seller. Id. at *1.
120. Pay Child Support Online Inc. v. ACS State & Local Solutions, Inc., No. Civ. 02-1231,
2004 WL 741465, at *9 (D. Minn. Apr. 5, 2004).
121. Id. at * 1. Thus, the invention relates to a method for processing payments and payment
information using debit-based electronic funds transfers. The patented claims contemplate
actions of separate entities: an employee, an employer, an accumulator agency, and in most cases
a bank or the state. See U.S. Patent Nos. 5,946,669 (filed Sept. 30, 1997) and 6,119,107 (filed
Jan. 7, 1998) (depicting patent claims which contemplate the actions of multiple entities).
122. Transferring payment information and instituting the payment was contemplated by the
first element of the patented claim. U.S. Patent Nos. 5,946,669 (filed Sept. 30, 1997) and
6,119,107 (filed Jan. 7, 1998). Thus, the defendant company had to use this information in order
to process the payments. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 38, BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P.,
498 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 29, 2006) (No. 2006-1503) [hereinafter Brief of PlaintiffAppellant].
123. See Gerdelman, supra note 31, at 2011 (discussing the "some connection" standard).
124. For example, in Marley Mouldings the court suggested that it would require further
information about the extent of connection between the parties, but that an undisputed connection
was sufficient to overcome summary judgment as a matter of law. Marley Mouldings Ltd. v.
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F. The "Participationand Combined Action" Standard

Although many district courts found that a party may be liable for
direct infringement when the various steps in a patented process are
performed by distinct entities, 125 until 2006 neither the Supreme Court
nor the Federal Circuit had addressed the issue. 12 6 The Federal
Circuit 12 7 first spoke to this issue in On Demand Machine Corp. v.
Ingram Industries.
In On Demand, the patent claimed a method of manufacturing a
single book copy, with the claims contemplating a direct consumer role
in selecting the book to purchase and print. 12 8 The patent owner sued
two defendants under a joint infringement theory; the first defendant
printed and sold books ordered by publishers, 129 and the second
defendant received orders from consumers and could order single copies
from the first defendant. 130 The jury found that both defendants
infringed upon the patent holder's invention. 13 1 On appeal, the Federal
Circuit reviewed the challenged jury instructions de novo. 132 The
district court had instructed the jury as to joint infringement as follows:
Mikron Indus., Inc., No. 02 C 2855, 2003 WL 1989640, at *3 (N.D. I11. Apr. 30, 2003).
Similarly, in Cordis Corp. the court found that the "close connection" was sufficient to impose
liability for direct infringement as a matter of law. Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic AVE, Inc., 194 F.
Supp. 2d 323, 349 (D. Del. 2002).
125. Id.; supra Part II.E (illustrating a variety of cases which had imposed direct liability on a
party who did not himself perform every step of the patented method).
126. Marley Mouldings, 2003 WL 1989640, at *2.
127. When the Federal Circuit was created in 1982, it was granted exclusive jurisdiction over
patent appeals. See supra note 103.
128. On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., 442 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The
patent at issue claimed a method where a retail seller of books provides a computer console for
customer use, wherein the computer stores promotional and other information such as book
reviews and price, and also stores the complete text of the book and the design of the cover. Id.
The customer can browse through the stored information, inspect the text, and select a book for
purchase; the book is then printed and bound, preferablyat the same site. Id.
129. Defendant "Lightning Source prints and sells books as ordered by publishers,
wholesalers, and retailers such as Amazon.com, but does not sell directly to the public." Id.
130. "Defendant Amazon.com is a seller of books and other products to the public on the
internet: its internet website provides promotional and sales information on individual books, and
receives orders from customers." Id. at 1335. The plaintiff argued that when a customer orders
from the retailer upon reviewing the retailer's promotional information, and the retailer in turn
orders that single book to be printed by the printer, the defendants together infringe the patent.
Id. at 1344.
131. Id. at 1336.
132. De novo is a standard of judicial review which is nondeferential to the lower court.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 864 (8th ed. 2004). A jury instruction based on incorrect law, such
as an erroneous claim construction that may have affected the verdict, receives de novo review.
Ecolab Inc. v. Paraclipse, Inc., 285 F.3d 1362, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2002). An erroneous jury
instruction may warrant a new trial, or the court may consider whether, on the correct instruction,
the jury could have reached only one verdict. On Demand, 442 F.3d at 1337.
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It is not necessary for the acts that constitute infringement to be
performed by one person or entity. When infringement results from
the participation and combined action(s) of more than one person or
entity, they are all joint infringers and jointly liable for patent
infringement. Infringement of a patented process or method cannot be
avoided by having another perform one step of the process or method.
Where the infringement is the result of the participation and combined

action(s) of one or more persons or entities, they are joint infringers
33
and are jointly liable for the infringement. 1

After considering the instructions, the panel resolved the issue by
stating that it "discem[ed] no flaw in this instruction as a statement of
law." 134 Although affirming joint infringement in principle, the panel
nevertheless found other grounds upon which to reverse the finding of
infringement. 35 Even in its reversal, by considering the conduct of
multiple discrete actors in determining whether joint infringement
existed, the panel's analysis further affirmed joint infringement as a
36
viable legal theory. 1
III. DISCUSSION
In 2007, the Federal Circuit was once again asked to settle the
question of whether the action of multiple entities could be combined to
find joint infringement of a process patent in BMC Resources, Inc. v.
Paymentech, L.P. 137 This Part begins by providing an overview of the
facts of the case. 13 8 Next, it discusses the recommendation of the
magistrate, including the magistrate's analysis of joint infringement

133.
134.

On Demand, 442 F.3d at 1344-45.
Id. at 1345.

135. The court reversed the finding of infringement on two grounds: (1)the separate actions
of each actor were in the prior art, and (2) the combined actions of the defendants failed to meet
the "all elements rule" because they lacked the direct consumer role that was contemplated by the
patented invention. Id. at 1345. "Prior art" consists of that which is known, used, patented, or
described by the patent applicant or others before conception and reduction to practice of the
patented invention. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). Because novelty is a requirement of patentability,
prior art is relevant for determining whether an invention is even patentable subject matter, as
well as whether an issued patent is valid when challenged in litigation. Id. Once an invention
runs afoul of the novelty requirement, the inventor is deprived of all rights. See DREYFUSS &
KWALL, supra note 29, at 636 (discussing 35 U.S.C. § 102's novelty requirement).
136. See On Demand, 442 F.3d at 1345. The court recognized that the patent contemplated
the action of multiple actors, and analyzed the actions of each discrete actor in reaching its
determination of noninfringement. Id. at 1344-45. By basing the finding of noninfringement on
the actors' failure to practice every element of the claimed invention, the Federal Circuit implied
that a finding of direct infringement could be appropriate had the combined actions practiced
every element of the claimed invention. Id.
137. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P. (BMC 11),
498 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
138. See infra Part III.A (setting forth the facts of the BMC case).
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liability.' 3 9 Then it details the district court's holding to affirm the
140
magistrate's findings and the reasoning underlying this decision.
Finally, this Part analyzes the Federal Circuit's holding, which requires
that one entity must "direct or control" the other entities whose actions
combine to infringe a patented process before direct infringement
liability may be imposed. 141
A. The Facts
BMC Resources, Inc. (BMC) is the assignee 142 of two patents which
claim a method of processing debit bill payment transactions without a
personal identification number (PIN). 14 3 The patented invention (the
Telepay system) 144 provides an interface between a touch-tone
telephone and a debit card network, facilitating real-time bill payment
transactions with a telephone keypad. 145 The invention includes an
interactive voice response unit (IVR) that prompts a caller to enter an
access number, debit card number, and payment amount. 146 The
information is passed to a debit network, and then on to a financial
institution. 14 7 The patent contemplates the actions of multiple entities,
participates in approving and carrying out the transaction
each of which
48
process.1
Paymentech, L.P. (Paymentech) processes payment transactions for
14 9
clients and offers PIN-less debit bill payment services.
Paymentech's processing operates in the following sequence: (1) the
139. See infra Part II1.B (discussing the Findings and Recommendation of the United States
Magistrate Judge).
140. See infra Part IfI.C (discussing the decision of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas).
141. See infra Part II.D (discussing the Federal Circuit decision).
142. An assignee is one to whom property rights or ownership are transferred by another.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 127 (8th ed. 2004).
143. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., No. 3-03-CV-1927-M, 2006 WL 306289, at *1
(N.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2006); U.S. Patent Nos. 5,715,298 (filed Jan. 22, 1997) (entitled "Automated
Interactive Bill Payment System Using Debit Cards"), and 5,870,456 (filed Oct. 7, 1997) (also
entitled "Automated Interactive Bill Payment System Using Debit Cards").
144. BMC was formerly known as Telepay. BMC Res., 2006 WL 306289, at * I n. 1.
145. Id. at *1. Using the invention, the caller may initiate a bill payment transaction, obtain
information regarding authorization of the transaction, and inquire about previously processed
transactions. Id.
146. Id.
147. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P. (BMC II), 498 F.3d 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
148. Approving and carrying out the transaction includes determining whether the account
number is valid, whether the debit number is valid, and whether sufficient funds or credit are
available to facilitate the transaction. Id.; U.S. Patent Nos. 5,715,298 (filed Jan. 22, 1997),
5,870,456 (filed Oct. 7, 1997).
149. BMC Res., 2006 WL 306289, at *1.
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customer calls the merchant to pay a bill; (2) the merchant prompts the
customer for payment information and sends the collected information
to Paymentech; (3) Paymentech routes the information to a participating
debit network; (4) the debit network forwards the information to an
affiliated financial institution; (5) the financial institution authorizes or
declines the transaction amount and, if authorized, charges the
customer's account according to the payment information; and (6)
information of the status of the transaction travels back from the
financial institution to the debit network and then, through Paymentech,

to the merchant who informs the customer of the status of the

transaction. 150 The different parts of the process are performed by retail
151
merchants, debit networks, and participating financial institutions.

Upon learning that Paymentech was offering PIN-less debit bill
payment services, BMC demanded that it enter into a licensing
agreement to use the Telepay system. 152 When it refused, BMC alleged
153
direct infringement and inducement of both patents in district court.

BMC's theory of liability was joint infringement: while Paymentech did
not itself perform all of the steps of the patented process, it participated,
coordinated, and worked in concert with third parties to perform all of
the steps. 154 In response, Paymentech denied liability due to the lack of
150. Id.
151. Id. at *5. The retail merchants collect payment information and send it to Paymentech;
the debit networks forward information obtained from Paymentech to affiliated financial
institutions; and the financial institutions authorize or decline the proffered transaction, charge the
customer's account, and send information about the transaction status back to the debit network.
Id. From there, the debit networks transfer information regarding the transaction status back to
Paymentech. Id. Finally, the retail merchants use information about the transaction status
obtained from Paymentech to inform the customer. Id.
152. Demanding a party enter into a licensing agreement likely gives that party notice of the
patentee's rights, as demanding a licensing agreement necessarily implies the existence of a
patent. This is particularly important because providing notice of patent rights is a condition
precedent to a patentee's ability to obtain money damages in litigation. 35 U.S.C. § 287 (2006).
The patent law thus places an affirmative duty on a patentee interested in obtaining money
damages to provide notice of its patent rights. LAWRENCE M. SUNG, PATENT INFRINGEMENT
REMEDIES 142-44 (2004).
153. BMC Res., 2006 WL 306289, at *5 n.4. BMC alleged infringement of claim 2 of the
'298 patent, which is made up of 13 elemental steps, and claim 7 of the '456 patent, which is
made up of seven elemental steps. Both claims incorporate the PIN-less debit bill payment
method. Because all seven of the steps in claim 7 of the '456 patent are included in the thirteen
steps of claim 2 of the '296 patent, the court's infringement analysis of the '296 patent included
both patents.
Paymentech preemptively filed suit seeking a declaration of non-infringement of the BMC
patents. The parties were then realigned, and BMC alleged infringement and inducement.
Paymentech filed a counterclaim seeking a declaration of non-infringement, as well as invalidity
of the '298 patent. Id. at ' I.
154. Id. at -2. Specifically, BMC alleged that Paymentech participated in and coordinated the
performance of the infringing transactions among itself, its retail merchant customers, various
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evidence that it performed every step of the patented method either by
156
itself or "in connection"' 155 with any other entity or entities.
B. The Recommendation of the MagistrateJudge
The case appeared before a magistrate judge on motions for summary
57
judgment by both BMC and Paymentech based on joint infringement.1
In analyzing joint infringement, the magistrate recognized that "courts
have suggested that a party may directly infringe a process patent where
various steps of the patent are performed by distinct entities." 158 In an
attempt to condense the body of joint infringement law, the magistrate
concluded that in cases where distinct entities were liable for direct
infringement, courts "appear to require a close relationship or
connection between the accused infringer and the other entity such that
the party accused of infringement directs or controls the actions of the
other party." 159 The magistrate subsequently proceeded with his
infringement analysis based upon his abbreviated "direction or control"
160
standard.
First, the magistrate analyzed Paymentech's relationship with its
merchant customers to determine if it directed or controlled the
16 1
merchants in performing the "prompting" and "informing" steps.
The "prompting" step occurred when the IVR prompted callers to enter
162
their account numbers, debit card numbers, and payment amounts.
The "informing" step occurred when the IVR informed customers as to
whether their payment transactions were authorized or declined.1 63 The
magistrate found that Paymentech satisfied the "direction or control"

debit networks, and participating financial institutions. Id.
155. Cf Part II.E. (discussing the "some connection" standard of joint infringement).
156. See BMC Res., 2006 WL 306289, at *2 (referencing the Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment Brief at 7-13).
157. Id. at *5. Both parties also filed motions for summary judgment with respect to the issue
of validity. However, for purposes of this Note, the issue of patent validity will not be discussed.
158. Id. at *4 (citing Marley Mouldings Ltd. v. Mikron Indus., Inc., No. 02 C 2855, 2003 WL
1989640, at *2 (N.D. 111.Apr. 30, 2003)). For a discussion of Marley Mouldings, see supra note
118 and accompanying text (illustrating the Marley Mouldings court's application of the "some
connection" standard).
159. Id. The court illustrated its observation on the state of the law by illustrating Cordis
Corp,Marley Mouldings, and Mobil Oil Corp. v. Filtrol Corp.
160. The magistrate's imposition of the "direction or control" standard is illustrated by
reasoning as to whether "the evidence ... is sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether Paymentech directs or controls the.. .steps performed by its retail merchants." Id. at
*5.
161. BMCRes.,2006WL306289,at*5.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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standard 16 4 because it (1) worked closely with the merchants to develop
the IVR scripts used in the prompting and informing steps, reviewed
merchant-drafted scripts, provided feedback, and recommended
changes; (2) communicated with debit networks on behalf of the
merchants; and (3) provided merchants with guidance and assistance in
16 5
processing the transactions.
Next, the magistrate analyzed Paymentech's relationship with the
debit networks and financial institutions. 16 6 The magistrate found that
the evidence was insufficient to show that Paymentech directed or
controlled the "determining," "charging," and "adding" steps performed
by the debit networks and financial institutions. 16 7 BMC pointed to the
1 68
contractual relationships between Paymentech and its debit networks
to show that it "works in concert"' 169 or "works jointly together" with
them. 170 Notwithstanding, the magistrate found the evidence
insufficient, reasoning that "no court has ever found direct infringement
17 1
based on the type of arms-length business transaction present here."
Rather, "cases appear to require an agency relationship or evidence that
164. The court stated that the evidence was indeed "sufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Paymentech directs or controls the 'prompting' and 'informing' steps
performed by its retail merchants."
Thus, summary judgment of noninfringement was
inappropriate. Id.
165. Id.
166. Remote payment networks performed three of the seven steps: determining whether
sufficient funds exist in the account, charging the payment amount against the account, and
adding the payment amount to the merchant's account. Id.
167. "The inference BMC asks the court to draw from this evidence does not establish
'beyond peradventure' that Paymentech directs or controls the alleged infringing activities of
these other entities." Id. at *6.
168. The court noted that Paymentech had contracts with named debit networks such as Star,
NYCE, and Pulse. Id. at *5.
169. Under traditional tort theory, persons are liable for the harm resulting to a third person
for acting in concert when he does a tortious act with another pursuant to a common design with
him, knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of a duty and gives substantial assistance
or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, or gives substantial assistance to the other in
accomplishing a tortious result and his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach
of duty to the third person. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979).
170. BMC Res., 2006 WL 306289, at *5. The contracts referenced were not offered into
evidence. Rather, BMC alleged that the mere existence of the contracts was sufficient evidence
of joint action between Paymentech and the debit networks. id.
171. Id. at *7. For the proposition that no court has ever found direct infringement based on
arms-length business transactions present in this situation, the court cited an American
Intellectual Property Law Association article about litigation strategies for divided infringement
claims. While this Article takes the position that establishing an agency relationship would
impart the greatest likelihood of success for a patent owner in litigation of divided infringement
claims, it does not state that it was necessary for success. See Mark A. Lemley et al., Divided
Infringement Claims, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 255, 281 (discussing litigation strategies for divided
infringement claims).
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directs or controls the infringing activities of the
the accused infringer
72
other parties."1
The magistrate concluded that Paymentech did not perform the
determining, charging, and adding steps, either by itself or in connection
with the debit networks and financial institutions." 17 3 Accordingly, it
that the court grant
found infringement did not exist and recommended
74
summary judgment in favor of Paymentech.1
C. The District Court Decision
In deciding the motions for summary judgment, the district court
considered the magistrate's recommendation and the binding On
Demand decision, which was issued in the interim between the
magistrate's recommendation and the district court's review. 175 Unlike
the magistrate, the district court accepted that liability may be shown
when an entity is "connected" to the other entities performing steps of a
patented process. 176 The court recognized the inconsistencies among
district courts regarding the connection required to show direct
infringement, but declined to import a specific standard for the
connection required to prevail in joint infringement cases. 177 On one
hand, sufficient connections had been found with just "some
connection," 17 8 while others held that a sufficient connection depends
172. BMC Res., 2006 WL 306289, at *6. In presenting this proposition, the court pointed to
Marley Mouldings, see supra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing the Marley Mouldings
holding), Cordis Corp., see supra note 114 and accompanying text (discussing the Cordis Corp.
holding). The court also pointed to evidence of the contractual relationships which itself
weighted against a finding of direction or control. The debit networks followed their own rules
and regulations for processing the allegedly infringing transactions. Id. In fact, Paymentech
could be fined if a merchant failed to comply with the regulations of the debit network. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., 442 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006). For a
discussion and analysis of On Demand, see supra Part H.F (discussing the Federal Circuit's
statement that it found "no flaw" in a jury instruction on joint infringement that stated "[w]hen
infringement results from the participation and combined actions of more than one person or
entity, they are all joint infringers"). Both parties filed supplemental briefs to address the On
Demand decision. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P. (BMC I), No. 03-CV-1927-M, 2006 WL
1450480, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 24, 2006).
176. BMC 1, 2006 WL 1450480, at *3 (citing Marley Mouldings). The district court also
noted the recent On Demand case, stating "[i]n a recent case, without analysis, the Federal Circuit
generally approved a jury instruction based on joint infringement of a process patent." Id.
177. In synthesizing the relevant case law, the court not only interpreted the express
statements of district courts, but also the inferences permitted by the holdings. For example, the
court noted that in Faroudja, "the court stated that 'some connection' must exist between the
entities, but also suggested that the entities must work 'in concert."' Id.
178. Applied Interact, LLC v. Vermont Teddy Bear Co., No. 04 Civ. 8713, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19070, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2005) (emphasis added). In this case, the court refused

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 41

on a showing of agency, a contractual relationship, direction, or
179
working in concert.

In a lengthy footnote, the district court dismissed the relevance of On
Demand.180 The court refused to accept the panel's statement that they

found "no flaw" in the jury instruction on joint infringement

81

as an

18 2

adoption of that instruction as a matter of law.
Rather, because the
On Demand court found non-infringement on other grounds, the court
reasoned that the "no flaw" language was mere dicta1 83 and unworthy of

judicial recognition.'

84

BMC contested the magistrate's finding that there was insufficient
evidence that Paymentech directed or controlled the debit networks and
financial institutions. 185
The district court separately analyzed
Paymentech's relationships with the debit networks and financial

institutions.1 86 First, although Paymentech routed transactions to debit
networks and provided them with data necessary to complete the
transactions, 187 the district court found that providing data without
to find noninfringement as a matter of law because the steps of the claim were performed by
connected entities. Id. at *27.
179. Hill v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:02-CV-186, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3389, at *17-18
(E.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2006) (suggesting that agency, a contractual relationship, direction, or
working in concert are sufficient to prove the required "connection" justifying the imposition of
liability for direct infringement).
180. BMC 1, 2006 WL 1450480, at *3 n.3.
181. The On Demand jury instruction regarding joint infringement, which the panel
determined to contain "no flaw" as a matter of law, stated as follows:
It is not necessary for the acts that constitute infringement to be performed by one
person or entity. When infringement results from the participation and combined
action(s) of more than one person or entity, they are all joint infringers and jointly
liable for patent infringement. Infringement of a patented process or method cannot be
avoided by having another perform one step of the process or method. Where the
infringement is the result of the participation and combined action(s) of one or more
persons or entities, they are joint infringers and are jointly liable for the infringement.
On Demand, 442 F.3d at 1344-45.
182. Id.
183. Dicta is afforded no precedential weight. See Allied Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v.
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 296 (1996) ("We accord no precedential weight to mere dicta.").
184. "Because the district court's definition of 'connection' was not relied on in the panel's
conclusion, the court refuses to read the panel's dictum that it found 'no flaw' as a wholesale
adoption of the district court's jury instruction." BMC 1, 2006 WL 1450480, at *3 n.3. Further,
the court reasoned that the panel in On Demand did not even reach the question of what kind of
connection was necessary between entities to sustain a jury verdict of joint infringement. Id.
185. Id. at *4.
186. The court noted that "[a]t this juncture, the Court need not consider whether BMC must
show that the financial institutions were directed or controlled by Paymentech, or whether it
would be sufficient to show that the financial institutions were directed or controlled by an entity
directed or controlled by Paymentech." Id. at *6 n. 10.
187. BMC alleged that Paymentech directed the debit networks in completing the patented
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instruction as to how to use the data is insufficient to show direction.1 88
Second, although Paymentech provided data to financial institutions,
including specific indicators and bank identification numbers, the court
held that this evidence failed to create an issue of fact as to whether it
189
directs or controls the financial institutions.
Alternatively, the court stated that even if the "some connection"
standard applied, the evidence was still insufficient to establish a
connection with the financial institutions. 190 The court refused to
assume without evidence that the financial institutions were "working
together, jointly or in concert, to perform the charging step," which
occurred when Paymentech provided information from the debit
networks to the financial institutions, who used that information to
charge the account. 19 1 The court also faulted the lack of either a
contractual or business relationship between BMC and the financial
19 2
institutions, further highlighting their tenuous connection.
BMC also objected to the magistrate's imposition of a "direction or
control" standard, arguing that it is improper and underinclusive, and
that the proper legal standard is "some connection" between entities
whose combined actions infringe a patent. 19 3 BMC argued the relevant
process by virtue of its routing and transmission of necessary data. In routing, Paymentech would
"reformat" the transaction instructions to communicate with the debit networks specifically.
Paymentech transmitted the account holder's name, the debit card number, the amount of
purchase, and the bill being paid to the debit networks. BMC did not argue that such
transmissions necessarily controlled the debit networks; rather, it argues that such transmissions
direct the debit networks. id. at *5.
188. The Court interpreted Vermont Teddy Bear's finding that "if the other entities were to
perform steps of the process patent they must do so according to the instructions provided on the
purported infringer's website." Id. (citing Applied Interact, LLC v. Vermont Teddy Bear Co.,
No. 04 Civ. 8713, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19070, at *16-17 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2005)) (internal
quotations omitted).
189. Id. at *6.
190. But see id. at *6 n.10 (stating that the court believed that it need not determine whether
BMC was required to show that Paymentech directed or controlled the financial institutions, or
whether it would be sufficient for BMC to show that Paymentech directed or controlled the debit
networks, who in turn controlled the financial institutions).
191. "Without evidence, the Court cannot assume that whenever Paymentech provides
information to the financial institutions through the debit networks, the financial institutions, in
response to such information, are acting in concert to charge the accounts." Id. For a discussion
of "working in concert" see supra note 170.
192. Vermont Teddy Bear, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19070, at *6 n.10.
193. BMC claims that it should not have to show that Paymentech "directs and controls" the
debit networks/financial institutions; rather, it should only have to show that Paymentech had
"some connection" with the debit networks. BMC I, 2006 WL 1450480, at *4. BMC argued that
the "direction or control" standard was particularly inappropriate in two circumstances: (1) where
a patent clearly contemplates that the method will be performed by multiple actors and the
relationship between these entities is the one described in the patent, and (2) it is unlikely, in light
of the realities of the business situation, that any one person or company would itself physically
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case law dictated that "some connection" was sufficient to impose
liability when the entities: (1) engaged in the same relationship
described in the patent, 194 (2) worked jointly or in concert to perform
the patented steps, 19 5 (3) had a contractual relationship, 19 6 or (4)
interacted during the ordinary course of a commercial business
relationship. 197 Nevertheless, the court agreed with the magistrate and
held that liability for direct infringement requires that a plaintiff prove
other entities whose
that the alleged infringer directs or controls the
98
1
process.
patented
the
infringe
combined actions
D. The Decision of the Federal Circuit
The case came to Federal Circuit by way of BMC's appeal of the
district court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of
Paymentech. 19 9 At issue was the proper standard for joint infringement
when the actions of multiple parties combine to practice all of the steps
of a patented process. 20 0 As it was conceded that other entities
if
performed some of the steps, the court set out to determine
20 1
infringement."
direct
for
liable
be
nonetheless
"may
Paymentech
Circuit Judge Rader began his analysis by stating:
These rules for vicarious liability might seem to provide a loophole for
a party to escape infringement by having a third party carry out one or
more of the claimed steps on its behalf. To the contrary, the law
imposes vicarious liability on a party for the acts of another in
perform all of the steps of the claim. Id.
194. See Pay Child Support Online Inc. v. ACS State & Local Solutions, Inc., No. Civ. 021231, 2004 WL 741465 (D. Minn. Apr. 5, 2004) (illustrating how the actions of multiple entities
were contemplated in the patent, and the actions of the defendants were exactly as contemplated
in the patent).
195. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (illustrating how the imposition of liability had
been found when entities worked in concert with others to infringe a patent).
196. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing the Marley Mouldings holding
that liability is appropriate when a party contracts out part of the process, and then itself
completes the process).
197. BMC I, 2006 WL 1450480, at *6.
198. "Having reviewed the Findings and the authorities cited by Plaintiff, the Court agrees
with Judge Kaplan and finds that Plaintiff must prove that the party accused of infringement
directs or controls the actions of the other entity or entities performing the steps of the process
patent." Id. Judge Kaplan was the magistrate judge who rendered the recommendation discussed
supra Part III.B (holding that direction and control must be established in order to impose liability
for direct infringement).
498 F.3d 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
199. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P. (BMC 11),
200. Leonard Conapinski, United States: The Federal CircuitRejects "Joint Infringement" of
a Patent, Oct. 31, 2007, available at http:vlex.comlvid/circuit-rejects-joint-infringement-patent31105733.
201. An actor is liable for direct patent infringement if, without authority, he makes, uses,
offers to sell, sells, or imports any patented invention into the United States. See supra note 49.
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circumstances showing
that the liable party controlled the conduct of
20 2
the acting party.

Bringing its statement of the law full circle, the court stated "[i]n the
context of patent infringement, a defendant cannot thus avoid liability
for direct infringement by having someone else carry out one or more of
20 3
the claimed steps on its behalf.
BMC's argument on appeal was that the "direction or control"
standard imposed by the district court constituted legal error, as contrary
20 4
to the Federal Circuit's standard set forth in On Demand.
Accordingly, the court examined the jury instruction on joint
infringement that the On Demand panel found to have "no flaw as a
statement of law." 20 5 While the court determined that On Demand
indeed set forth a different standard regarding the requisite connection
between entities for joint infringement, it did not credit the change
because the On Demand panel "did so without any analysis of the issues
presented relating to divided infringement." 20 6 As such, Judge Rader
held that BMC's interpretation of On Demand was beyond settled
7
law.

20

Dismissing On Demand, the court conducted an analysis of the
proper standard for divided infringement liability. 20 8 It began by

202. BMC 11, 498 F.3d at 1379. Regarding vicarious liability, the court cited the unpublished
decision Engle v. Dinehart, 213 F.3d 639 (5th Cir. 2000), which in turn relied upon the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958).
203. In coming to this legal conclusion, the court relied on Cross Med. Prods. v. Medtronic
Sofamor Danek, 424 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Here, the Cross court refused to attribute the
acts of surgeons to the medical device manufacturer, when the manufacturer's representative
appeared in the operating room and identified the instruments for the surgeons, but did not direct
the surgeon's actions. The Cross case was remanded for further consideration as to whether the
surgeons directly infringed by making the claimed apparatus and whether the medical device
manufacturer could be held vicariously liable for such infringing acts. Id. at 1312.
204. BMC 11, 498 F.3d at 1379; see also Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 122 (arguing
that a "direction or control" standard was contrary to the On Demand standard requiring
"participation and combined action").
205. See supra text accompanying note 133 (setting forth the jury instruction discussed in On
Demand).
206. BMC 11, 498 F.3d. at 1379-80. The Federal Circuit reasoned that the "district court
properly analyzed the law and this court's cases." Id. at 1380. The court also adopted the district
court's analysis, reasoning that it was unlikely that the On Demand panel intended to make a
major change in jurisprudence in a statement that was not directly necessary to the case's ultimate
holding. "Instead, On Demand primarily addressed the claim construction issue that governed the
outcome of the case." Id. at 1380.
207. Id. The court found BMC's "participation and combined action" standard to be beyond
settled law because "On Demand did not change this court's precedent with regard to joint
infringement." Id.
208. "Divided infringement liability" is a phrase used interchangeably with "joint
infringement liability," meaning that the allegedly infringing conduct is divided between multiple
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pointing to two cases which found that a party could not be liable for
direct infringement if it did not perform all the steps of the patented
process. 20 9 Citing only the district court, the Federal Circuit then
summarized that "[c]ourts faced with a divided infringement theory
generally refused to find liability where one party did not control or
direct each step of the patented process." 2 10 As an exception to this
rule, the court recognized that "[a] party cannot avoid infringement,
however, simply by contracting out steps of a patented process to
another entity. In those cases, the party in control would be liable for
direct infringement. It would be unfair indeed for the mastermind in
2 1
such situations to escape liability." 1

Notably, the court expressed concern that the "direction or control"

standard for joint infringement "may in some circumstances allow
2 12
parties to enter into arms-length agreements to avoid infringement."
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit held that the concern over parties
circumventing liability did not trump concerns over expanding the rules

governing joint infringement. 2 13

This holding was based upon the

court's determination that expanding liability for direct infringement to
subvert the
reach "independent conduct of multiple actors would
2 14
infringement.
indirect
and
direct
for
scheme"
statutory

entities.
209. The court pointed to Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565, 1568 (Fed.
Cir. 1983) (finding no direct infringement by manufacturer who performed the first step of a
process claim even where its customer performed the other step of the claim), and Cross Med.
Prods., 424 F.3d at 1311 (rejecting patentee's efforts to combine the acts of surgeons with those
of a medical device manufacturer to fine direct infringement of an apparatus claim). BMC 11, 498
F.3d at 1380.
210. Id. In stating this proposition, the court also cited Mobil Oil Corp. v. Filtrol Corp.
(Mobil Oil Corp. ConsolidatedCases), 501 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1974), reasoning that it "expressed
doubt" over the possibility of divided infringement liability. Mobil Oil Corp. ConsolidatedCases
was an appellate decision of consolidated cases, one of such consolidated cases being Mobil Oil
Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co. (Mobil Oil Corp.), 637 F. Supp. 207 (D. Conn. 1973). Mobil Oil
Corp. ConsolidatedCases found that the patents were not infringed based on claim construction,
and not based on the issue of joint infringement. The relevant issue of joint infringement was
discussed in the Mobil Oil Corp. decision. For a discussion of Mobil Oil Corp., see supra text
accompanying note 98 (discussing how Mobil Oil Corp. imposed liability on a company for
direct infringement when its customers performed the last step of the patented process).
211. BMC II, 498 F.3d at 1381 (citing Shields v. Halliburton Co., 493 F. Supp. 1376, 1389
(W.D. La. 1980)).
212. Id.
213. Id. The Federal Circuit feared that permitting the imposition of joint infringement
liability on an entity who failed to "direct or control" the other entities whose combined actions
infringed the process would create overbroad liability for direct infringement, rendering the
statutory enactments for indirect liability necessarily meaningless. Id.
214. Id.
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The court derived its conclusion of resulting statutory subversion by
comparing the direct and indirect infringement statutes, and the
requirements for liability as to each.2 15 The court concluded that the
purpose of the "specific intent" 216 requirement for indirect liability was
to limit the dangers of expanding direct infringement liability. 2 17 Direct
infringement, unlike indirect infringement, is a strict liability offense

which is not limited by the infringer's mental state.2 18 Applying the
purported purpose of the "specific intent" requirement in the indirect
infringement statutes to direct infringement, the court reasoned that
direct infringement liability should also be limited by the "specific
intent" requirement where an infringer does not perform all of the steps
himself.2 19 Under the court's analysis, expanding direct infringement
liability to hold "independent actors" strictly liable without a "specific
intent" limitation would: (1) oppose legislative intent to limit direct
infringement, and (2) render the indirect infringement statutes
meaningless because a plaintiff could instead rely on direct
220
infringement for a remedy.
215. Recall that causes of action for indirect infringement-that is, contributory infringement
and inducement-are only available to a plaintiff if there is a preliminary finding of direct
infringement. 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(b), (c) (2006); supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text
(discussing indirect infringement). Liability for direct infringement does not require any showing
of a mental state on the part of the alleged infringer, while liability for indirect infringement
requires a showing of some mental state on the part of the alleged indirect infringer. Compare 35
U.S.C. § 271(a) (defining direct infringement), with 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(b), (c) (defining indirect
infringement).
216. "Specific intent" is a term of art generally used in criminal law, defined as "the intent to
accomplish the precise criminal act that one is later charged with." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
826 (8th ed. 2004). Unlike strict liability offenses, specific intent offenses require some
minimum proof as to the mental state of the actor. Id. Thus, indirect infringement is not a strict
liability offense because it requires some minimum proof as to the mental state of the alleged
indirect infringer.
217. The court illustrated how the dangers of overbroad liability may be limited by a statutory
requirement of specific intent. BMC H1,498 F.3d at 1381. The court pointed to the statutory
language of indirect infringement causes of action (which by definition anticipate the action of
multiple entities), to show that the legislature felt such causes of action necessitated a specific
mental state on the part of the accused actor. Id.
218. Strict liability offenses impose liability without a requirement as to the mental state of the
actor. A strict liability offense is an offense for which the action alone is enough to warrant
imposing liability, with no need to prove a mental state. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1I 11 (8th
ed. 2004). Under general tort principles, it does not depend on actual negligence or intent to
harm, but is based on the breach of an absolute duty to make something safe. Strict liability most
often applies either to ultrahazardous activities or in products-liability cases. Id. at 934
219. BMC I, 498 F.3d at 1381. Thus, the court reiterated the rule that direct infringement
requires a party to perform or use each and every step or element of the claimed method or
product. See Conapinski, supra note 200 (discussing the Federal Circuit's rejection of broad joint
infringement theories).
220. BMC H, 498 F.3d at 1381. Conversely, the court reasoned that because indirect liability
requires a showing of specific intent, "[u]nder BMC's proposed approach, a patentee would
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In light of the recognized risks posed by the "direction or control"
standard, the court offered its solution: proper claim drafting. 22 1 The
court faulted BMC's "ill-conceived claims" for choosing to have four
different parties perform different acts within one claim. 2 22 To avoid
the risk of actors escaping liability, the court stated that a patent
applicant should "structure a claim to capture infringement by a single
party, '223 suggesting that BMC should have drafted its claims to focus
on one entity. 2 24 As such, the court refused to "unilaterally restructure
the claim or the standards for joint infringement to remedy these ill
2 25
conceived claims."
Applying the "direction or control" standard to the facts, the court
adopted the lower courts' conclusion that the evidence was insufficient
to establish that Paymentech directed or controlled the activity of the
debit networks. 22 6 Specifically, the court noted Paymentech's failure to
provide instructions or direction as to the use of the data it supplied.2 2 7
And even though the court admitted that evidence illustrating
instruction would "allow it to survive summary judgment," the court
refused to infer instruction from the provision of data alone. 2 28 Finally,

rarely, if ever, need to bring a claim for indirect infringement." Id.
221. Claim drafting occurs during patent prosecution. Patent prosecution is the process of
applying for a patent through the United States Patent and Trademark Office (U.S.P.T.O.) and
negotiating with the patent examiner. See infra note 406 (discussing patent prosecution).
222. "The concerns over a party avoiding infringement by arms-length cooperation can
usually be offset by proper claim drafting." BMC II, 498 F.3d at 1381.
223. Id. (citing Lemley, supra note 171, at 272-75).
224. The court expanded on its "single entity claim drafting" solution, explaining that "the
steps of [BMC's] claim might have featured references to a single party's supplying or receiving
each element of the claimed process." Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. But see Privasys, Inc. v. Visa Int'l, No. C 07-03257 SI, 2007 WL 3461761, at *2
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2007). In Privasys, the court construed BMC in a later case with similar
patented technology, holding that a party could overcome summary judgment. The court
reasoned as follows:
[The] plaintiff has already indicated that it can produce precisely the type of evidence
that had been absent in BMC Resources, i.e. that [the defendant] provides instructions
or direction regarding the use of its [device] to the merchants and banks involved in the
process, and also that [the defendant] has a contractual relationship with the financial
institutions.
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
228. BMCl1, 498 F.3d at 1381-82.
BMC argues that instructions or directions can be inferred from the provision of these
data, or that the data themselves provide instructions or directions. Having presented
no evidence to support either theory, BMC is not entitled to the inference with respect
to the debit networks that would allow it to survive summary judgment.
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the court specifically faulted the lack of evidence "of a contractual
relationship" 22 9 between Paymentech and the financial institutions. In
conclusion, the Federal Circuit found no basis for holding Paymentech
vicariously liable for the actions of such unrelated parties who carried
2 30
out some of the steps of the asserted process claims.
IV. ANALYSIS

The "direction or control" requirement for joint infringement liability
that resulted from the Federal Circuit's BMC decision is erroneous as a
matter of law. This Part dissects the legal and logical deficiencies of the
Federal Circuit's BMC holding. 2 3 1 First, this Part discusses the court's
flawed logic in inferring that "direction or control" was required by
precedent and erroneously adopting the standard. 2 32 Next, this Part
analyzes how the "direction or control" standard was contrary to, and an
2 33
unwarranted upward departure from, the great weight of precedent.
This Part then discusses the court's failure to adequately incorporate the
On Demand holding in its analysis. 23 4 Finally, this Part discusses the
"direction or control" standard's inconsistencies with the statutory
2 35
scheme and congressional intent.
A. The "Directionor Control" Requirement Was a Result of Erroras a
Matterof Law
The "direction or control" requirement was based upon the incorrect
application of legal precedent and erroneous analyses by the deciding
courts. The magistrate judge's erroneous conclusion that "direction or
control" was required by precedent was subsequently adopted as a
matter of law by both the district court and the Federal Circuit.
Accordingly, this Part begins by highlighting the logical flaws
underlying the magistrate's decision. 2 36 Next, this Part tracks this
229. Id. at 1382.
230. Id. at 1375.
231. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 122 (discussing the legal errors present in the
Federal Circuit's BMC opinion).
232. See infra Part 1V.A (explaining why the Federal Circuit erred in inferring that precedent
required a "direction or control" standard).
233. See infra Part IV.B (discussing how a "direction or control" standard was contrary to the
established body of joint infringement jurisprudence).
234. See infra Part IV.C (explaining how the On Demand holding required "participation and
combined action," not "direction or control").
235. See infra Part IV.D (discussing why the "direction or control" standard is inconsistent
with the statutory scheme, because joint infringement aligns neatly with the statutory scheme and
Congressional intent).
236. See supra Part III.B (setting forth the holding and reasoning of the magistrate judge).
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opinions,
erroneous logic through the district court and Federal Circuit 23
7
standard.
control"
or
"direction
magistrate's
the
adopted
which
To begin, the magistrate erred in reasoning that in cases where
distinct entities were liable for direct infringement, the requisite "close
relationship" existed only when the "party accused of infringement
directs or controls the actions of the other party." 238 In reaching this
conclusion, the magistrate reviewed Mobil Oil, Cordis, and Marley
Mouldings; but requiring a "direction or control" relationship is directly
contrary to the holdings in these cases. Rather, the very cases from
which the magistrate drew the "direction or control" standard serve to
illustrate a significantly lower threshold for establishing direct
23 9
infringement.
The relationship sufficient to impose liability in Mobil Oil, based on
the defendant's sale of the product and knowledge that the process
would be completed, is far more attenuated than "agency" and/or
"direction or control."'2 40 Under legal principles of agency, sale and
knowledge fall far short of forming an agency relationship, 2 4 1 so
inferring an agency requirement from the Mobil Oil Court's mere use of
the word ignores black letter law. Further, even the magistrate himself

237. See supra Part III.C-D (setting forth the holding and reasoning of the district court and
the Federal Circuit respectively).
238. See supra note 159 and accompanying text (illustrating the magistrate's attempt to square
its perceived conflicting theories of law by imposing the "direction or control" standard).
239. Compare Mobil Oil Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co. (Mobil Oil Corp.), 367 F. Supp. 207,
253-54 (D. Conn. 1973) (finding sale and knowledge to be sufficient for imposing direct
infringement liability), ruled not infringed on other bases by Mobil Oil Corp. v. Filtrol Corp.
(Mobil Oil Corp. Consolidated Cases), 501 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1974), with Cordis Corp. v.
Medtronic AVE, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 2d 323, 349 (D. Del. 2002) (adopting the "some connection"
standard), and Marley Mouldings Ltd. v. Mikron Indus., Inc., No. 02 C 2855, 2003 WL 1989640,
at *3 (N.D. 11. Apr. 30, 2003) ("A party cannot avoid direct infringement merely by having
another entity perform one or more of the required steps when that party is connected with the
entity performing one or more of the required steps."). The circumstances under which liability
was imposed in these three cases set forth a distinctly lower standard than "direction or control."
240. In Mobil Oil Corp., a seller was found liable for direct infringement by virtue of its
knowledge and sale to purchasers who completed the patented process. Mobil Oil Corp., 367 F.
Supp. at 253-54. The crux of the court's determination was founded on the defendant "knowing
full well that the infringement step would in fact be promptly and fully completed by those
customers." Id. at 253 (emphasis added).
241. Mere knowledge or sale is insufficient to bring about an agency relationship. A legal
agency relationship requires that both the agent and the principal manifest their assent to the
agency relationship. An agent must act on behalf of the principal. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY § 1.01 (2006). The principal must have the legal right to control the acts of the agent,
and to terminate the agent's authority to act on its behalf. Id. cmt. c. The agency relationship
must be of a fiduciary nature, such that the agent is required to act in the principal's best interest
as a matter of law. Id. cmt. e. Once an agency relationship is established, the actions of an agent
are attributable and binding upon the principal. Id. cmt. c.
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stated that sale and knowledge are insufficient to establish "direction or
control. 2 4 2 Indeed, had the magistrate's own proffered standard been
applied in Mobil Oil, there could have been no finding of direct
24 3
infringement.
Similarly, a "direction or control" requirement could not reasonably
be inferred from Cordis, which expressly adopted the lesser "some
connection" standard and rejected arguments that entities must have an
agency relationship. 2 44 In fact, the Cordis holding is opposite of what
the magistrate's standard would require: even if direction or control was
exhibited by the seller, the Cordis court instead imposed liability on the
24 5
purchaser who had been the object of any such direction or control.
Likewise, the Marley Mouldings court deemed the "some connection"
standard appropriate in concluding that "a party cannot avoid direct
infringement . . . when that party is connected with the entity
246
performing one or more of the required steps."
Next, and without analysis, 24 7 the district court adopted the
24 8
magistrate's "direction or control" requirement as a matter of law.
242. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., No. 3-03-CV-1927-M, 2006 WL 306289, at *6
(N.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2006) ("[T]he legislative history of section 271(a) indicates Congress's
understanding that method claims could only be directly infringed by use.") (quoting NTP, Inc. v.
Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1318-21 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
243. See supra text accompanying note 242. The Mobil Oil Corp. court imposed liability by
virtue of the defendant's sale, while the magistrate himself expressly stated that sale was not
sufficient to impose liability for direct infringement. As such, the connection between entities
whose combined action infringed the patent in Mobil Oil Corp. would fall short of the "direction
or control" standard, as it constituted mere sale.
244. "To constitute a predicate act of direct infringement of a process claim, either a single
entity must perform every step of the method or, if two or more entities perform different steps of
the method, those entities must have some connection to each other." Cordis Corp., 194 F. Supp.
2d at 349. The court rejected the argument that entities must work in concert, work together
jointly, or have an agency relationship, and found no compelling argument to change the
standard. Id. at 349 n.19.
245. Id. at 349-50.
246. Marley Mouldings Ltd. v. Mikron Indus., Inc., No. 02 C 2855, 2003 WL 1989640, at *3
(N.D. Il1. Apr. 30, 2003). The Marley Mouldings court felt the need to conduct an analysis on the
appropriate standard for divided infringement liability, noting that "[nleither the Supreme Court
nor the Federal Court of Appeals has addressed the issue of whether a party who does not
perform every step of a method claim may be liable for direct infringement of a method claim
where separate entities perform separate steps of a method claim." Id. at *2.
247. Instead, the district court merely stated: "Having reviewed the Findings and the
authorities cited by Plaintiff, the Court agrees with Judge Kaplan and finds that Plaintiff must
prove that the party accused of infringement direct or controls the actions of the other entity or
entities performing the steps of the process patent." BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P. (BMC
1), No. 03-CV-1927-M, 2006 WL 1450480, at *6 (N.D. Tex. May 24, 2006).
248. However, when synthesizing the relevant case law, the district court itself illustrated that
the common thread among district courts required only "some connection," while noting the
otherwise inconsistent requirements. The district court began by stating the overarching
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The problems presented by the district court's unsubstantiated adoption
of the "direction or control" standard are twofold. First, the district
court's failure to independently analyze the required standard for joint
infringement constitutes the same legal error for which the district court
faulted the On Demand court. 2 4 9
Second, the district court's
demonstrated awareness of the inconsistencies in joint infringement
precedent 250 warranted an independent review, as opposed to the
251
expedient adoption of the magistrate's flawed analysis.
Unlike the district court, the Federal Circuit recognized the need for
an independent analysis of the proper standard for joint infringement of
a patented process. 25 2 However, while doing so, the Federal Circuit
cited the district court for the proposition that courts have "generally
refused to find liability where one party did not control or direct each
step of the patented process." 25 3 The Court's logic is inapposite. The
Federal Circuit itself recognized the novelty of the "direction or
control" standard; 254 therefore, the district court's statement cannot be
said to support a generally accepted precedential principle. 2 55 Further,
even though the magistrate and district court erred in their analysis of

requirement of "some connection" between specific entities, but noted that "courts vary, however,
as to what kind of 'connection' between the entities they require a party to prove to show direct
infringement." Id. at *3.
249. In the district court's dismissal of On Demand, it pointedly noted that the court's finding
of "no flaw" in the instruction as a statement of law was conducted "[w]ithout analysis." Id. at *3
n.3. This criticism was part of the district court's reasoning in finding the On Demand holding
unpersuasive.
250. See supra note 248 and accompanying text (illustrating the court's awareness of the
inconsistent "connection" requirements for imposing direct infringement liability).
251. See supra text accompanying notes 238-246 (illustrating the errors in the magistrate's
analysis).
252. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P. (BMC I1), 498 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
The Federal Circuit impliedly disapproved of some aspect of the lower court's analysis despite
affirming that court's holding.
253. Id. at 1380. The Federal Circuit used the Magistrate's statement that "[n]o court has ever
found direct infringement based on the type of arms-length business transaction presented here"
to infer this general proposition. Id. (quoting BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., No. 3-03-CV1927-M, 2006 WL 306289, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2006)).
254. The language of the Federal Circuit's analysis illustrates its awareness that the "direction
or control" standard is novel. Id. at 1381; see also infra notes 295-301 and accompanying text
(discussing the reasons that the Federal Circuit itself recognized that the "direction or control"
standard was a departure from precedent).
255. Either a principle is novel or it is not. This is akin to the age-old problem with the
marketing phrase "new and improved." Either a product is new and has never been made before,
or it is an improvement on a product that has been made before and thus is not new.
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precedential case law, 256 the reviewing court failed to recognize and
257
remedy this defect.
In its analysis, the Federal Circuit pointed to two cases where liability
was not imposed because the party failed to perform all of the steps
itself: Cross Medical Products, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek,
Inc.2 58 and Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc. 2 59 The Federal
Circuit erred in applying the reasoning of the Cross court because the
patented invention in that case was an apparatus, not a process. The
infringement analysis of a process differs from that of an apparatus
because the acts of infringers to practice the process are determinative
in the former, while the accused product itself is determinative in the
latter.260 Further, the determination of infringement liability was never
26 1
reached in Fromson, as the case was remanded to the district court.
In sum, the magistrate, district court, and Federal Circuit erred in
26 2
concluding that "direction or control" was required by precedent.
B. Requiring "Directionor Control" Was Contrary to Legal Precedent
Beyond the absence of precedent requiring "direction or control" for
joint infringement, the Federal Circuit's decision was contrary to the

256. Supra Part V.A.
257. See supra text accompanying notes 238-246 (illustrating the errors in the magistrate's
analysis). Further, the Federal Circuit misinterpreted the very law in which it recognized it was
departing from, in stating that "expanding the rules governing direct infringement to reach
independent conduct of multiple actors would subvert the statutory scheme for indirect
infringement." BMC 11, 498 F.3d at 1381 (emphasis added). As discussed infra Part IV.B,
precedent did not impose liability for direct infringement when actors were independent, rather
"some connection between the different entities" has always been required to justify findings of
direct infringement. Faroudja Labs., Inc. v. Dwin Elecs., Inc., No. 97-20010 SW, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22987, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 1999).
258. Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
259. Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
260. Infringement of a process patent, unlike a patented apparatus, turns on the "use" of the
known machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material. See 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2006).
Thus, actions of defendants are critical in determining whether a process patent has been
infringed, because all of the steps of the patent must be performed. On the other hand, the device
itself is critical to an infringement analysis of an apparatus patent. The test of whether an
apparatus patent has been infringed looks to whether "every limitation recited in the claim is
present in the accused device." Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 96 F.3d 1398, 1405 (Fed.
Cir. 1996). Therefore, the combined action of multiple entities is vastly more important to the
infringement analysis of a process patent.
261. Fromson, 720 F.2d at 1571. The Fromson court stated that "the determination of
infringement and contributory infringement must await complete findings in the first instance by
the district court." Id.
262. Supra Part IV.A.
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entire body of direct infringement jurisprudence. 2 63 The "direction or
control" standard requires an agency relationship, which constitutes a
26 4
drastic and unwarranted departure from the well-established rules.
Precedent requires, at most, participation and combined action between
265
entities, not direction or control.

More than one hundred years of law supports imposing liability on
those who facilitate infringement by others. 2 66 Courts as early as 1871
found joint infringement where the combined actions of multiple
entities infringed a patent. 26 7 Before the 1952 Patent Act, courts were

willing to impose liability for direct infringement on parties who
participated

to infringe process patents. 26 8

Direct infringement

jurisprudence was intended to be preserved after the passage of the 1952
Patent Act.2 69 Subsequent cases recognized that pre-1952 precedent

263. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 122, at 28, (illustrating how the district
court's conclusion that a plaintiff must prove that the accused infringer directed or controlled the
actions of other entities performing the steps of the process patent is contrary to On Demand, the
patent statute, patent policy, and the great weight of prior district court decisions).
264. Id. at 38-39.
There is simply no basis for concluding that prior district court decisions appear to
require an agency relationship or evidence that the accused infringer directs or controls
the infringing activities of the other parties . . . At most, some decisions have held
evidence that a participant who directs, controls, or instructions the others is sufficient,
but not necessary, to hold that participant liable.
Id.
265. See supra Parts I.C-F (discussing prior district court decisions, as well as the evolution
of direct infringement jurisprudence).
266. In 1980, the Supreme Court applied the reasoning of an 1871 case for the proposition that
liability exists for those who facilitate infringement by others. See Amicus Brief of Production
Resource Group LLC Supporting Rehearing En Banc at 2, Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp.,
532 F.3d 1318, (W.D. Penn. Aug. 7, 2008) (No. 2007-1485) [hereinafter Amicus Brief of
Production Resource Group LLC Supporting en banc Rehearing] (discussing how the Supreme
Court's reasoning is equally applicable in the context of joint infringement).
267. Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F. Cas. 74, 80 (D. Conn. 1871). This case found infringement of
a lamp patent where each party completed a part "in actual concert with a third a party, with a
view to the actual production of the patented improvement." Id. The court found that the parties'
steps were "each utterly useless without the other, and each intended to be used.. .with the other,"
such that they were held to be "joint infringers of the complainant's patent." Id.
268. See Bullock Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 129 F. 105, 112 (6th
Cir. 1904) (finding infringement where there is an "intent to assist another in an infringing use of
the patented method"); see also Peerless Equip. Co. v. W.H. Miner, Inc., 93 F.2d 98, 105 (7th Cir.
1937) (affirming a finding of infringement because the manufacturer passed the nearly-finished
gears onto the customer "with the knowledge that the railroads will put them to use and thereby
flatten the crown, thus completing the final step of the process").
269. See infra note 331 (discussing Senate Reports accompanying the 1952 Patent Act); see
also supra note 89 (illustrating how courts interpreting infringement after passage of § 271(a)
stated that the section "left intact" the "entire body of case law on direct infringement" and thus
recognized that direct infringement precedent had not been disturbed); infra Part IV.D (discussing
the statutory language and legislative history of the 1952 Patent Act).
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indeed survived the passage of the Act, 2 70 and that section 271 "left
intact the entire body of case law on direct infringement." 2 7 1 With
precedent undisturbed, cases after the Patent Act continued to impose
liability for direct infringement when an actor did not complete every
step of the patented
method,2 7 2 so long as the entities had some
3
connection.

27

While pre-1952 cases generally imposed liability on the selling
party,2 74 a line of district court cases after 1952 gave rise to
inconsistencies and exceptions, 2 75 which serve to illustrate the extent to
which the controlling standard for joint infringement remains
"participation and combined action," not "direction and control. '27 6
Ultimately, courts have consistently held that any "unauthorized use,

270. Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 26-27 (1997).
271. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 483 (1964).
272. See Gerdelman, supra note 31, at 2006-11 (discussing the evolution of joint infringement
liability, namely district court decisions which imposed liability upon an entity who did not
themselves perform every step of a patented process).
273. "[C]ourts have found a party liable for direct infringement of a process patent even where
the various steps included in the patent are performed by distinct entities. However, these cases
indicate that some connection between the different entities justified that finding." Faroudja
Labs., Inc. v. Dwin Elecs., Inc., No. 97-20010 SW, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22987, at *15 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 24, 1999).
274. E.g. Mobil Oil Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co. (Mobil Oil Corp.), 367 F. Supp. 207 (D.
Conn. 1973).
275. A line of district court decisions after the 1952 Act generally imposed liability on the
purchasing party. E.g., E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Monsanto Co., 903 F. Supp. 680, 73335 (D. Del. 1995). This shift in the imposition of liability based upon an actor's order of
performance did not create a bright line rule, but rather created inconsistencies and exceptions.
For example, in Dupont the court held a completing party liable when it paid the selling party to
perform a step of the patented process, while the Mobil Oil Corp. court imposed liability on a
selling party who knew infringement would be completed by its customers. The Dupont court
determined that it was more appropriate to impose liability on the party which bought and
completed the patented process, reasoning that it could not avoid liability for infringement "by
paying [selling party] to practice step (a) of the patented process for it." Dupont, 903 F. Supp. at
735. The court went on to explain:
None of these cases holds, however, that the third party who performs one step of a
patented process and then sells the resulting product to the direct infringer ... is also
liable as a direct infringer under § 27 1(a). Clearly, the direct infringer in this case is
[the party] who buys the [product encompassing the first step of the patented process]
and then uses it to perform the process claimed.
Id.
276. For example, Dupont and Cordis turned the purported "direction or control" standard
upside down. In each case, the participant held liable for direct infringement was being directed
or controlled by another participant, rather than the other way around." See Brief of PlaintiffAppellant, supra note 122, at 39 (discussing how these two cases were inconsistent with a
"direction or control" standard, and served to illustrate the "some connection" standard).
Similarly, in Mobil Oil Corp., the selling entity was held liable, and the completing entity escaped
liability. Mobil Oil Corp., 367 F. Supp. at 211.
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without more, constitutes infringement," 2 77 encompassing the combined
action of multiple entities who use a patented process. Thus, the
traditional rule remains that liability for direct infringement results
when the combined action of two or more distinct entities results in
27 8
infringement.
In effect, the "direction or control" standard requires an agency
relationship between entities, 279 which is a considerable upward
departure from participation and combined action. 2 80 The very first
paragraph of the Federal Circuit's opinion stated that it found no basis
to hold Paymentech "vicariously responsible" for the actions of the
other entities. 2 8 1 Vicarious liability necessarily infers an agency

relationship-without an agency relationship vicarious liability may not
be imposed. 28 2 The court continued to use agency language throughout
the opinion, later stating "the law imposes vicarious liability on a party
for the acts of another in circumstances showing that the liable party
controlled the conduct of the acting party." 2 83 Phrased in this way, the

277. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 484 (1964) (citing
Birdsell v. Shaliol, 112 U.S. 485 (1884); Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U.S. 107, 114 (1922);
Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 32-33 (1929); Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v.
Western Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124, 127 (1938)).
278. "Liability is imposed on each participant equally and indiscriminately-they are joint
infringers and jointly liable for patent infringement." See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note
122, at 30 (discussing how On Demand confirms the general rule that liability can be established
regardless of whether one participant directs or controls the others).
279. The Federal Circuit adopted the magistrate's statement of the law, requiring "an agency
relationship or evidence that the accused infringer directs or controls the infringing activities of
the other parties" before direct infringement liability could be imposed. BMC Res., Inc. v.
Paymentech, L.P., No. 3-03-CV-1927-M, 2006 WL 306289, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2006)
(emphasis added); BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P. (BMC I1), 498 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir.
2007) ("The district court properly analyzed the law and this court's cases.").
280. "This is a rather strict standard, contemplating almost an alter ego and certainly not a
mere customer relationship." Lemley, supra note 171, at 260 (discussing the "direction or
control" standard).
281. BMC11,498 F.3dat 1379.
282. Vicarious liability is defined as the "[Il]iability that a supervisory party (such as an
employer) bears for the actionable conduct of a subordinate or associate (such as an employee)
based on the relationship between the two parties." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 934 (8th ed.
2004). Agency is a fiduciary relationship created by express or implied contract or by law, in
which one party (the agent) may act on behalf of another party (the principal) and bind the other
party by words or actions. An agency relationship renders the principal legally liable for the
actions of its agent. Id. at 67. Thus, vicarious liability may not be imposed without an agency
relationship. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 541-43 (1999) (discussing how
vicarious liability is limited to the acts of a principal's agent); Pa. State Police v. Souders, 542
U.S. 129, 144 (2004) (discussing how vicarious liability is imposed on an employer when the
"agent is aided in accomplishing the tort by existence of the agency relation").
283. BMC I, 498 F.3d at 1379.
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court implied that proving "direction or control" is the only sufficient
means by which a party may prove the requisite agency relationship.284
An agency relationship is a substantial increase in the standard for
joint infringement. 28 5 Patent infringement amounts to a tortious taking
of the patentee's property, 28 6 so joint infringers are held jointly and
severally liable.2 87 Under general principles of tort law, however, joint
and several liability does not require that parties have an agency
relationship, but merely requires that their participation and combined
28 8
action resulted in the tort.

Vicarious liability, in fact, is a distinctly different basis of liability
Specifically, the
when compared to joint and several liability.
mechanisms by which each doctrine attaches liability to a defendant are
drastically different. 2 89 Vicarious liability imposes liability on an actor
for a tort that was admittedly a result of the conduct of another by virtue
of the actor's agency relationship with the other, even though the
290
tortious injury was not a direct result of the actor's conduct.
However, joint and several liability looks to whether the conduct of all
of the actors resulted in the injury, and then imposes liability on all of
the actors jointly and severally. 29 1 In terms of joint and several liability,

284. See Lemley, supra note 171, at 281. Discussing litigation strategies for divided patent
claims, the author "emphasize[d] that proof of agency is something that requires direction and
control, and not merely a customer relationship. As a result, it will not be appropriate in all or
even most cases of divided infringement." Id.
285. See infra text accompanying notes 295-301 (illustrating the Federal Circuit's
acknowledgement that its holding was a departure from precedent).
286. Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641 (1915).
287. Joint and several liability may be apportioned either among two or more parties or to
only one of a few select members of the group, at the adversary's discretion. Thus, each liable
party is individually responsible for the entire obligation. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 933 (8th
ed. 2004).
288. "Liability attaches to each participant when an infringement results from the participation
and combined action(s) of more than one persons or entities. The participant who performs one
step for another participant is also jointly liable even though such participant would not have
directed or controlled anyone." Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 122, at 30 (internal
citations and quotations omitted).
289. Joint and several liability is a question of cause in fact: should liability attach because,
without the combined actions of the defendant actors, this single indivisible injury would not
have occurred? Conduct is the cause in fact of an injury when the harm would not have occurred
absent the conduct. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 26 (2005). On the other hand, vicarious
liability is a question of proximate cause: after finding the actors are the cause in fact of the
injury, should liability attach by virtue of the relationship between the defendant actors?
Proximate cause is often called legal cause, and is a policy determination as to whether the
consequences were reasonably foreseeable such that liability should attach. See id. (discussing
proximate cause).
290. See supra note 282 (defining vicarious liability).
291. See supra note 287 (defining joint and several liability).
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the injury was indeed a direct result, in part, of the conduct of the
actor. 29 2 Accordingly, the great weight of precedent reflecting the
"participation and combined action" standard closely aligns with
29 3
general tort principles of joint and several liability.
The Federal Circuit itself recognized that its holding was a drastic
departure from established precedent because it fully explained the
reasoning behind imposing the standard. 294 Under general standards of
judicial conduct, had the Federal Circuit viewed the standard as a mere
2 95
continuation of precedent, this explanation would be unnecessary.
The Federal Circuit's express acknowledgement that the new "standard

requiring direction or control may in some circumstances allow parties
to enter into arms-length agreements to avoid infringement" further
illustrates this point.2 96 The word "may" is especially significant
because it speaks to the present or future, and does not indicate the
past. 2 97 Finally, the Federal Circuit felt it further necessary to hedge its
stringent standard in multiple portions of the opinion. 29 8 For example,
the Federal Circuit spent its entire infringement analysis explaining how

"direction or control" was necessary to justify imposing vicarious
liability, and then essentially undercut its assertion by stating it would
be "unfair" in certain instances. 2 99 In effect, this provided an essential
"How To Avoid Liability" roadmap to potential infringers.3 00 Thus, in
292. See supra note 287.
293. See supra Part IV.B (discussing how the great weight of precedent required participation
and combined action, not direction or control).
294. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P. (BMC II), 498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
295. When a court acts in accordance with a generally established principle of law, they
generally do so sub silentio, or without being expressly mentioned. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1469 (8th ed. 2004). In contrast, when a court intends to change the law it is generally improper
to do so sub silentio. Therefore, it can be inferred that a court's express mention and analysis of a
change in the law is, in fact, a departure from the previous standard of the law. See Amicus Brief
of Production Resource Group LLC Supporting en banc Rehearing, supra note 266, at 5
(discussing how it would be improper for a panel to change the law sub silentio).
296. BMCII,498F.3dat 1381.
297. As set forth in the dictionary, "may" is a present auxiliary verb, and can be used to
express possibility, opportunity, permission, or contingency. In contrast, "might" is ordinarily
used as the past tense form of the verb "may," used to express past possibility, past opportunity,

or past permission.

RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY

(Random House 2006).

Therefore, in this context the Federal Circuit's use of the word "may" illustrates its recognition
that imposition of this standard will have a novel effect in the future, as it is a departure from the
previous standard.
298. For example, the Federal Circuit notes that, in some circumstances, it would impose
liability for direct infringement, as "[i]t would be unfair indeed for the mastermind ... to escape
liability." BMC 11, 498 F.3d at 1381.
299. Id.
300. The Federal Circuit essentially told potential infringers how to avoid liability by
admitting that parties may circumvent infringement liability by entering arms-length agreements.
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the very same opinion, the Federal Circuit grappled for possible
solutions to the monster it had itself created.3 °1
C. On Demand Required "Participationand Combined Action"
Both the district court and the Federal Circuit erred in failing to fully
consider the Federal Circuit's en banc holding in On Demand, which
was controlling precedent. 30 2 The On Demand case unmistakably
confirmed that joint infringement is a viable legal theory and results
30 3
from the participation and combined action of more than one entity.
Both courts erred in dismissing the panel's statement of the legal
standard for joint infringement as mere dictum.30 4 The Supreme Court
has held that portions of an opinion that include the final disposition of
a case as well as preceding determinations necessary to that result are
holdings, not dicta.30 5 The On Demand court was squarely presented
with the question of joint infringement liability; the conclusion as to the
jury instruction was a preceding determination necessary to the resulting
conclusion on joint infringement. 30 6 The Federal Circuit's en banc
Id.
301. The court attempted to offer a solution to the "concerns over a party avoiding
infringement by arms-length cooperation," the solution being drafting claims to capture
infringement by only a single party. Id.
302. The Federal Circuit's precedent is binding as a matter of law on subsequent district
courts. Further, in On Demand the Federal Circuit was sitting en banc, which means that the case
was considered and heard by a three judge panel. This carries additional precedential weight
because the Federal Circuit sitting en banc may only be overruled by the Supreme Court or
another Federal Circuit decision made en banc. Arthur D. Hellman, "The Law of the Circuit"
Revisited: What Role for Majority Rule?, 32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 625, 625 (2008).
303. Plaintiff's Supplemental Brief to Advise the Court of New Federal Circuit Authority on
Joint Infringement in Support of BMC's Objections, BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P, 2006
WL 1450480 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2006) (No. 3:03-CV-1927-M).
304. Central to each Court's dismissal of the On Demand statement of the law with respect to
joint infringement liability was the fact that the case turned upon other grounds, so that the
"participation and combined action" standard it imposed was non-precedential. BMC Res., Inc.
v. Paymentech, L.P. (BMCI), No. 03-CV-1927-M, 2006 WL 1450480, at *3 n.3 (N.D. Tex. May
24, 2006); BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P. (BMC 11), 498 F.3d 1373, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir.
2007). While the Federal Circuit did conduct a minimal analysis of the On Demand case, it too
dismissed the holding as non-binding, reasoning that the jury instruction was "not even directly
necessary to its decision in the case." BMC H, 498 F.3d at 1380.
305. Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 663 n.4 (2001). "As a general rule, the principle of stare
decisis directs us to adhere not only to the holdings of our prior cases, but also to their
explications of the governing rules of law." County of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union,
Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 688 (1989). Instead, dicta consists of statements in
judicial opinions upon a point or points not necessary to the decision of the case. In re McGrew,
120 F.3d 1236, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
306. To reach the issue of joint infringement, the On Demand court first had to decide that the
jury instruction pertaining to joint infringement contained no flaw. Second, the court had to
determine whether the defendants combined to infringe all of the steps of the patent. Therefore,
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review of the jury instruction thus amounted to a precedential holding as
to the legal standard for joint infringement, and this warranted judicial
consideration. 30 7 The jury instruction was also directly challenged on
appeal,30 8 so the Federal Circuit 9was also speaking within its authority
30
to resolve the challenged issue.
Plainly, the Federal Circuit must have intended that lower courts
3 10
deciding joint infringement cases follow the On Demand holding.
Less than five months before On Demand, the Federal Circuit
recognized that it had not previously addressed the issue of joint
infringement. 3 11 The Federal Circuit would not have issued a decision
addressing a recognized issue of first impression-sitting en banc
nonetheless-unless it intended the decision to be followed. 3 12 The
language of On Demand itself illustrates the panel's recognition of the
3 13
need to address this issue.

the first determination was necessary to address the evidence of joint infringement. Brief of
Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 122, at 30-31.
307. Id.
308. See On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., 442 F.3d 1331, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
("On this appeal defendants.., dispute various jury instructions.").
309. The Federal Circuit spoke to the importance of jury instructions, illustrating its
recognition of the need to resolve this issue upon appeal. "A jury instruction based on incorrect
law, such as an erroneous claim construction that may have affected the verdict, receives de novo
review. An erroneous jury instruction may warrant a new trial." Id.
310. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 122, at 31.
311. Freedom Wireless, Inc. v. Boston Commc'ns Group, Inc., Nos. 06-1020, 1078-79, 109899, 2006 WL 2883135, at *6-7 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 15, 2005) (stating that "[tihis court has not
directly addressed the theory of joint infringement... "). Before Freedom Wireless arrived in the
Federal Circuit, the district court provided the following jury instruction:
If separate companies work together to perform all of the steps of a claim of a patent,
the companies are jointly responsible, that is, responsible as a group-for the
infringement of the patent. Even if no single company performs all of the steps of a
claim, the companies are jointly responsible. Thus, to prove joint infringement
liability, the patent owner must show that separate companies worked together to
perform all of the steps of a claim.
R. Trevor Carter, Ramifications of Recent Decisions on Business Method and Software Patents, in
THE IMPACT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ON YOUR PRACTICE 2007, at 813, 832 (PLI Litig. &
Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 899, 2007). The Federal Circuit hearing Freedom
Wireless actually requested briefs on the joint infringement issue, but did not have the
opportunity to address the correctness of the district court's jury instruction before the case
settled. Id.
312. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 122, at 31-32. As the purpose of the Federal
Circuit is to promote uniformity in patent law, it would be imprudent to address an issue of first
impression without intending such an opinion to be followed.
313. See supra note 309 (discussing the Federal Circuit's illustration of the importance of jury
instructions).
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D. The "Directionor Control" Standardis Inconsistent with the
Statutory Scheme and CongressionalIntent
The Federal Circuit erred in reasoning that permitting joint
infringement liability without a finding of "direction or control" would
subvert the statutory scheme for indirect infringement. 3 14 In fact, joint
infringement is consistent with the statutory design and the
congressional intent behind it and would not controvert claims of
indirect infringement.
Construction of § 271(a), 3 15 the statute governing direct infringement
liability, makes clear that joint infringement is included within the
parameters of the statute. 3 16 The operative statutory language to
consider is "whoever ...uses ... any patented invention . . . infringes
the patent." 3 17 The words of a statute are given their ordinary meaning
absent an indication that Congress intended otherwise. 3 18 The ordinary
meaning of the word "whoever" is plural, and means "whatever person
or persons."3 19 Thus, the plain statutory language contemplates direct
320
infringement when a group of persons practice the patented process.
Conversely, the plain language of § 271(a) does not state, much less
require, "direction or control. ' 32 1 It is a generally accepted principle
that if Congress sought to impose a critical statutory requirement, it
would expressly say so. 3 2 2 Without a relationship requirement in the
32 3
plain statutory language, one cannot and should not be imported.
314. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P. (BMC If), 498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
("Expanding the rules governing direct infringement to reach independent conduct of multiple
actors would subvert the statutory scheme for indirect infringement.").
315. Only subsection (a) of § 271 outlines direct infringement; subsections (b) and (c) outline
causes of action for indirect infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006); see also supra notes 78
and 79 (outlining indirect infringement).
316. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 122, at 31.
317. Id.
318. Bayer AG v. Housey Pharm., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also NTP,
Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1317-18 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (construing § 271(a)).
319. Dictionaries of the English language provide the ordinary meaning or words used in
statutes. Bayer, 340 F.3d at 1371; THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 1631 (4th ed., Houghton Mifflin Co. 2004) (defining "whoever" as "whatever person
or persons") (emphasis added).
320. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 122, at 33.
321. Id.
322. See New Jersey v. Delaware, 128 S. Ct. 1410, 1433 (2008) (stating that application of
this principle makes statutory construction "perfectly clear"); Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 680 (2007) (stating that, had the framers meant to make a
drastic change in the law, they would have said so); Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 153 (2005)
(stating that, had the legislature meant for requirements to be included in the law, it would have
said so explicitly).
323. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 122, at 33.
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Congressional intent illustrates that an agency relationship is not
required because the codification of direct infringement was intended to

encompass situations
in which the actions of multiple entities combine
3 24

to infringe a patent.
Congressional intent to impose direct infringement liability when
parties jointly infringe a patented process also aligns with the statutory
326
scheme 325 and the intent underlying indirect infringement provisions.
The purpose of the indirect infringement statutes is to prevent
circumvention of a patentee's exclusive rights when a party
"appropriates the benefit of the invention" without facing liability. 32 7
Because Congress thought it was vital to prevent circumvention of a
patentee's exclusive rights, it created new forms of infringement
liability. 328 This action considerably expanded the rights of patent
owners.

3 29

The critical component of the statutory scheme, however, remains the
required predicate finding of direct infringement in order to have any
recourse for indirect infringement. 3 30
Congress viewed indirect
infringement mechanisms as important; 33 1 it must follow that Congress
likewise intended to prevent circumvention of a patentee's rights
through direct infringement enforcement mechanisms. 3 32 Without first
324. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the survival of the pre-1952 precedent regarding joint
infringement).
325. A fundamental canon of statutory construction holds that "statutory provisions in pari
materia normally are construed together to discern their meaning." Erlenbaugh v. United States,
409 U.S. 239, 243-44 (1972). This principle applies to both statutes in pari materia, as well as
sections of a single statute. Id.
326. Joy Techs., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc. 6 F.3d 770, 775 (1993).
327. S. Rep. No. 82-1979, at 8 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2402 (stating
that indirect infringement prevents appropriation of another man's patented invention, and has
been characterized as an expression of both law and morals).
328. Id. (discussing the new codified forms of indirect infringement).
329. Due to §§ 271 (b) and (c), a patent owner whose patent had been directly infringed would
have additional recourse against those entities who appropriated the benefit of the patented
invention.
330. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 483 (1964).
331. Senate Reports accompanying the 1952 Patent Act maintained that the law shall continue
to enjoin "those who sought to cause infringement by supplying someone else with the means and
directions for infringing a patent." Supra note 327. This statement was taken from the Senate's
discussion of contributory infringement, and illustrates the established importance of indirect
infringement mechanisms.
332. Congressional intent to broadly construe direct infringement within the statutory scheme
is further illustrated by 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1). Under this statute, when a medical practitioner
performs an activity which would constitute direct infringement or inducement of infringement,
an injured plaintiff may not recover injunctive relief, damages, or attorney's fees from the
medical practitioner or a related health care entity. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (2006). This statute
was enacted for policy reasons regarding medical processes. It is important to note that this
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closing the gaps in patent protection in the predicate context of direct
infringement, secondary enforcement mechanisms would be rendered
meaningless, providing absolutely no relief to a patentee whose rights
were circumvented by the combined action of multiple entities. 3 33 The
bedrock principle of statutory construction that statutes should not be
interpreted to render portions meaningless lends further support to this
conclusion. 334 Indeed, the statutory indirect infringement mechanisms
would be rendered meaningless and ineffective if interpreted to prevent
circumvention of a patentee's rights only in the context of indirect
infringement. Preventing circumvention of a patentee's rights in the
context of indirect infringement can only be effectuated by first
preventing circumvention in the predicate context of direct
335
infringement.
The divergent specific intent requirements between the direct and
indirect infringement statutory provisions further demonstrate
Congress's intent to provide broad patent protection. 336
Direct
infringement is a strict liability offense, so the actor's mental state is

statute merely prohibits an injured patentee from obtaining remedies; it does not excuse liability
for direct infringement. The reasoning behind merely limiting remedies is illustrative. As
discussed previously, the medical practitioner would be the "completing party" in the context of a
patented process, and therefore his use would constitute direct infringement. See, e.g. E.I. Dupont
de Nemours & Co. v. Monsanto Co., 903 F. Supp. 680, 733-35 (D. Del. 1995). However,
Congress recognized that excusing liability for direct infringement would subvert the statutory
scheme, because patent owners of medical processes would be unable to prove predicate direct
infringement and therefore their exclusive rights would be essentially nonexistent.
333. Unless direct infringement is recognized when the actions of distinct entities are
combined to infringe a patent, there will be a remaining loophole in the rights granted to patent
owners. Process patent owners would have no defined remedy against parties who each perform
only part of the process, although their combined action constitutes performance of the whole
process to which the patentee had been granted exclusivity. Gerdelman, supra note 31, at 2004.
Interestingly, this very circumvention was expressly recognized by the BMC court as a negative
byproduct of requiring "direction or control" between entities. The Federal Circuit expressly
stated: "This court acknowledges that the standard requiring control or direction for a finding of
joint infringement may in some circumstances allow parties to enter into arms-length agreements
to avoid infringement." BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P. (BMC 11), 498 F.3d 1373, 1381
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
334. Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 519 U.S. 465, 472 (1997).
335. Preventing circumvention of a patentee's exclusive rights through only indirect
infringement would serve no purpose unless direct infringement were construed broadly enough
to also prevent circumvention of a patentee's exclusive rights. Thus, joint patent liability would
facilitate the purpose behind indirect infringement, rather than unreasonably expand infringement
liability. But see Lemley, supra note 171, at 262 (stating that conflating indirect infringement
with direct infringement would unreasonably expand liability for direct infringement).
336. By defining what conduct short of direct infringement is sufficient to impose liability for
indirect infringement, §§ 271(b) and (c) do not somehow also define what conduct establishes
what defines the predicate act of direct infringement. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note
122, at 35.
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irrelevant to liability. 3 37
Congress determined that the act of
infringement alone is sufficiently egregious 338 to warrant liability for
direct infringement. 339 In contrast, a culpable mental state on the part of
the defendant is required before liability for indirect infringement may
attach. 340 The Federal Circuit in BMC correctly inferred that the

purpose of the "specific intent" requirement for indirect infringement
was to narrow the scope of liability; 34 1 however, this limitation is only

applicable to indirect infringement liability. Its omission from § 271(a)
provides compelling evidence that the intent requirement was not meant
to apply to direct infringement. 342 Establishing "direction or control"
amounts to a specific intent requirement; thus, the Federal Circuit erred
34 3
in importing this limitation to direct infringement liability.

337. See supra notes 216 and 218 (defining strict liability offenses in the context of both civil
and criminal offenses); accord text accompanying note 215 (stating that § 271(a) neither
enumerates not suggests a requirement of mental state). Contra Long Truong, supra note 37
(suggesting a strong intent requirement of all alleged infringers should be required to impose
liability for joint infringement, amounting to a cause of action for civil conspiracy).
338. Strict liability offenses are an exceptional means for attaching liability. Generally, a
mental state is required to hold an actor liable unless there is a clear legislative purpose for
dropping the requirement. Such purposes often include public welfare offenses or regulatory
offenses, and particularly egregious offenses. Public welfare offenses impose strict liability
because the action poses a high risk to the public, and the importance of the collective interest
justifies imposing strict liability. See Staples v. U.S., 511 U.S. 600 (1973) (discussing strict
liability and public welfare offenses).
339. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1111 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "offense" as a "violation of
the law; a crime, often a minor one"). Construed in this way, the statutory scheme aligns with
patent policy because it grants the inventor a meaningful right to exclude. See infra Part V.A
(explaining why imposing a "direction or control" relationship between entities is inconsistent
with patent policy, as it limits a patent owner's right to exclude).
340. See supra notes 78 and 79 (explaining the mental states required to impose liability for
indirect infringement).
341. Supra note 217 and accompanying text. The court inferred that imposing a mental state
on an indirect infringer would thus negate the dangers of overexpansive liability. As indirect
infringement is a secondary remedy for an injured patentee, a mental state requirement does
indeed limit the outer reaches of infringement liability and prevent overexpansion. For example,
§ 271(a) does not apply to an entity that performs no steps of a patented method. However, that
same entity could be liable for inducing infringement under § 271(b). Brief of PlaintiffAppellant, supra note 122, at 35.
342. The well-established legal principle inclusio unius est exclusio alterius supports this
position. See New Jersey v. Delaware, 128 S. Ct. 1410, 1433 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(stating that application of this principle makes statutory construction "perfectly clear"). In Latin,
this means to include one is to exclude others. Similarly, had Congress meant to include a mental
state limitation for direct infringement, it would have done so expressly. See supra note 322 and
accompanying text (illustrating cases which determined that, had the legislature meant to include
requirements in the law, it would have said so explicitly).
343. Gerdelman, supra note 31, at 1999 (stating that a state of mind requirement is contrary to
existing direct infringement jurisprudence).
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The judicially-created doctrine of equivalents provides further
support that statutory intent requires that direct infringement be
construed broadly. 344 This doctrine provides even broader protection
against direct infringement by imposing liability on the producer of a
device 34 5 that performs substantially the same function, in substantially
the same way, to obtain substantially the same result as the patented
invention. 34 6 By imposing direct infringement liability even where the
defendant does not practice every element of the invention, 347 courts
have sought to avoid "convert[ing] the protection of a patent grant into a
348
hollow and useless thing."
Therefore, the Federal Circuit erred in reasoning that imposing
liability for direct infringement when the independent conduct of
multiple actors combines to infringe a patent would subvert the
statutory scheme for indirect infringement. 34 9 In fact, it would subvert
the statutory scheme to deny liability and impose gaps in the exclusive
350
rights of a patentee in the predicate context of direct infringement.
The misplaced reasoning of the BMC holding makes it even more
necessary to analyze the impact that this holding will have on the future
35
of infringement jurisprudence and the patent system. '
V.

IMPACT

The BMC decision has had, and will continue to have, a devastating
impact on the patent system. 35 2 This Part will begin by discussing how
344. The doctrine of equivalents was first set forth in the case of Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S.
330 (1853).
345. While this Note focuses on process patents, as opposed to device patents, the
Congressional intent to impose liability for direct infringement even when every literal patented
detail is not copied is applicable.
346. Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929). The theory on which it is
founded is that, if two devices do the same work in substantially the same way, and accomplish
substantially the same result, they are the same, even though they differ in name, form, or shape.
Union Paper-Bag Mach. Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 (1877).
347. Prouty v. Draper, 41 U.S. 336, 340 (1842) (setting forth the "all elements rule").
348. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 399 U.S. 605, 608 (1950). The
Supreme Court stated that "[t]he essence of the doctrine is that one may not practice fraud on a
patent." Id.
349. This reasoning was central to the Federal Circuit's imposition of the "direction or
control" standard. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P. (BMC 11),
498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
350. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 482 (1964) (stating
that there can be no indirect infringement without a predicate finding of direct infringement).
351. See infra Part V (illustrating the devastating impact that the BMC holding will have on
the patent system).
352. See generally Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 122, at 41-47 (arguing that BMC
will have a deleterious effect on the patent system).
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the "direction or control" standard leaves a glaring loophole in patent
law that is inconsistent with patent policy and the business realities of
modem society. 353 Next, it will explain how the Federal Circuit's
suggestion of "proper" claim drafting is an insufficient solution to the
existing dangers. 354 Finally, this Part will discuss how subsequent cases
is an
have further expanded the "direction or control" standard, which
35 5
alarming trend that threatens the stability of the patent system.
A. The "Directionor Control" StandardImposes a Loophole in Patent
Law That Is Inconsistent with Patent Policy
The Federal Circuit's requirement of "direction or control" creates a
glaring loophole in patent law for patented methods that contemplate
the action of multiple entities. 3 56 The impact of the "direction or
control" standard is contrary to fundamental patent policies. 3 57 It
diminishes and destroys the exclusive rights of process patent owners
because such patents are rendered markedly vulnerable to
circumvention. 3 58 This harm is exacerbated by the inherent uncertainty
of judicial enforcement of patent rights. 359 By diminishing patent
rights, the standard upsets the quid pro quo contemplated by the
Constitution. Finally, the "direction or control" standard threatens the
functionality of the patent system by decreasing incentives for
360
innovation.
The loophole imposed in patent law is no secret: the Federal Circuit
expressly noted that process patents contemplating the actions of
multiple entities are vulnerable to circumvention under a "direction or
control" standard. 36 1 Thus, due to the BMC decision, current law

353. See infra Part V.A (explaining how the "direction or control" standard imposes a
loophole in patent law that is inconsistent with patent policy).
354. See infra Part V.B (illustrating why "proper" claim drafting will not alleviate the dangers
presented by the "direction or control" standard).
355. See infra Part V.C (illustrating how cases after BMC have further heightened the standard
to one of agency).
356. Gerdelman, supra note 31, at 2003 (discussing the loopholes in the patent system for

process patent owners).
357. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 122, at 41-47 (discussing how the
consequences of the "direction or control" standard are inconsistent with patent policy).
358. Petition for Panel Rehearing En Banc of Plaintiff-Appellee at 14, Muniauction, Inc. v.
Thomson Corp., 522 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. July 28, 2008) (No. 2007-1485) [hereinafter
Muniauction Petition for en banc Rehearing of Plaintiff-Appellee].
359. See Lemley, supra note 171 (discussing the risks of filing a lawsuit based solely on
infringement of a divided patent claim).
360. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 122, at 41-47.
361. Even the Federal Circuit itself noted this risk when setting forth the heightened standard.
See supra text accompanying note 296 (quoting the Federal Circuit's language in acknowledging
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provides little solace for patent owners faced with divided patent
claims. 3 62 Process patent owners do not have any remedy against
connected entities separately performing only parts of the process even
though the combined action constitutes performance of the whole
3 63
process to which the patentee has been granted exclusivity.
Permitting a method patent to be so effortlessly circumvented equates to
permitting de facto infringement, rendering the patentee's rights
3
essentially meaningless. 6
The Supreme Court requires that the patent laws be interpreted to
give effect to their "object and policy," 36 5 their primary purpose being
to foster innovation through the grant of an exclusive right. 36 6 This
right to exclude is "the very essence" of the rights conferred by a
patent. 36 7 As the strength of any legal right is defined by the
availability of an appropriate remedy, 36 8 denying the privilege of
exclusion essentially destroys the patent right. 36 9 The patent right is
crippled by the denial of infringement remedies absent an agency
relationship because it no longer prevents "any unauthorized use" as
required by statute. 370 Conversely, when connected entities jointly
infringe a patented process, imposing liability for infringement
is
37 1
exclude.
to
right
meaningful
owner's
patent
a
with
consistent

the risks it imposed).
362. Lemley, supra note 171, at 284.
363. Gerdelman, supra note 31, at 2003.
364. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 122, at 44. Anyone could read a patent that
discloses an invention involving several participants, copy exactly what is described in the patent,
and avoid infringement through arms-length business relationships that divide the steps of a
patented method without any one participant directing or controlling the actions of the other
participants. Id.
365. Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting
U.S. Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 455 (1993)).
366. The Constitution dictates that the primary purpose of the patent laws is to "promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8; see
also supra Part II.B (discussing how innovation is achieved by granting an inventor a legal
monopoly for a limited period of time).
367. Cont'l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405,429 (1908).
368. SUNG, supra note 152, at 2. "A right without a remedy is as if it were not. For every
beneficial purpose it may be said not to exist." Id. (citing Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71
U.S. 535, 554 (1886)).
369. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
370. It has often and clearly been held that any unauthorized use of a patented invention,
without more, constitutes infringement. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377
U.S. 476,484 (1964).
371. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 122, at 42.
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The "direction or control" standard upsets the quid pro quo of the
Constitution because an inventor claiming a method that contemplates
the action of multiple entities obtains essentially nothing in exchange
for his public disclosure. 37 2 He receives nothing because BMC's
"direction or control" limitation on infringement liability eradicates his
exclusive right. 37 3 Moreover, the heightened exposure to circumvention
that method patents suffer makes judicial enforcement of divided patent
claims increasingly risky. 374 Thus, the intended balance between the
right to exclude and public disclosure is thwarted by the "direction or
3 75
control" standard.
Importantly, the "direction or control" standard diminishes the patent
system's very function of fostering innovation, thereby chilling
progress. 3 76 In distorting or destroying a patentee's right to enforce its
patent, the patentee has essentially no right to exclude. 377 Recall,
however, that the patent system operates to foster innovation only
because it offers inventors these exclusive rights and the economic
benefits inherent to them. 378
The impact of allowing de facto
infringement of a process patent does not stop at chilling innovation for
breakthrough patents; it also chills the incentive for improvement
patents. 379 Even Congress has recognized how doubt shadowing patent
rights hinders the incentive to innovate. 380 As the law stands presently,
372. In a 2009 FTC and DOJ hearing, Judge Newman of the Federal Circuit stated that this
disclosure requirement is presently "as important as ever." Supra note 72.
373. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 122, at 42.
374. See Lemley, supra note 171, at 279-80 (discussing litigation strategies for divided patent
claims). The author states that:
Before filing suit, plaintiffs should carefully consider the risks of filing based solely on
infringement of a divided patent claim. Because of the many problems inherent in
proving infringement of such claims, every effort should be made to minimize reliance
on them in litigation ... Accordingly, counsel must advise clients carefully about these
risks, while seeking to find other, non-divided claims on which to base a suit.
Id.
375. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 122, at 42.
376. See supra text accompanying note 56 (discussing the primary purpose of the patent
laws).
377. Gerdelman, supra note 31, at 2012.
378. See supra notes 61-71 and accompanying text (illustrating that the patent system
operates to foster innovation through providing economic incentives in a variety of ways).
379. Gerdelman, supra note 31, at 2012. Allowing de facto infringement of a process patent
also weakens the incentives for manufacturers other than the patentee to "invent around" or
improve upon a patent. If other manufacturers can perform a patented process, albeit in
connection with another company, and thereby skirt infringement liability, the law does not push
these other manufacturers to innovate and improve upon the patented process. See supra note 70
and accompanying text (discussing how the "inventing around" principle of the patent system
fosters innovation by providing economic incentives).
380. Doubt surrounding patent law can hinder the incentive to innovate and to utilize the
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it provides markedly less incentive to invent new processes and
methods.
B. The StandardIs Harmful to Innovation in Light of the Business
Realities of Modern Society
Failure to impose liability when the participation and combined
action of multiple entities infringe a patented method poses particularly
egregious harm to innovation in light of the business realities of modem
society. 38 1 The harm to innovation is especially forthcoming in the
booming technology, communication, and
medical industries that are
3 82
economy.
States
United
the
to
important
Today businesses must increasingly rely on patent protection;
especially in technology related areas, companies rely on their patents
as major assets. 38 3
In today's world of globalization and
commercialization, process claims that contemplate the action of
multiple entities 384 are increasingly common. 385 Today, significant
patent system and thereby may have ramifications on the nation's economy as a whole.
"Congress recognized this danger in 1982 when it created the CAFC, and it applies even more so
today because of businesses' increased reliance on patent protection." Gerdelman, supra note 31,
at 2014.
381. In the information age, intellectual property is taking its proper place as a valued asset on
companies' balance sheets. Intellectual property increasingly forms a large part, if not the
majority of an entity's value. Joby A. Hughes & Kate L. Birenbaum, Insuring Intellectual
Property Risks: Creative Solutions on the Cutting Edge, in PROTECTING YOUR INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ASSETS 1999, at 205 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course
Handbook Series No. GO-0084, 1999). Today, businesses have increased their reliance on patent
protection. Especially in technology-related areas, companies have come to rely on their patents
as a major asset. IP/Tech Advisor, Patent Licensing: Another Way to Increase Return on
Investment,
GOODWINPROCTER,
July
2001,
http://www.goodwinprocter.com/-/media/
78C8197B8CE44B479A 12E6B54COFI C38.ashx.
382. "The nation's strong patent system has enabled us to be a world leader on innovation."
Press statement of Jim Greenwood, President, Biotechnology Indus. Org., BIO Encourages
Congress
to
Improve
Patent
System
(Mar.
3,
2009),
available
at
http://www.bio.org/news/pressreleases/newsitem.asp?id=2009 0303_01.
Greenwood warned
that weakening intellectual property protection would jeopardize that leadership. Id.; Drug
Industry Remains Concerned About Proposal to Revise Patent System, 7 BNA PHARM. LAW &
INDUS. REPORT 262 (Mar. 6, 2009).
383. Gerdelman, supra note 31, at 2014. The separate entities loophole also deprives process
patent owners of potential licensing royalties available. IBM reportedly received $1.6 billion in
licensing royalties. Although an extreme example, this illustrates the high stakes for patent
investment and utilization. Id.
384. These are also called "multi-user claims," "divided patent claims," or "distributed
claims." Lemley, supra note 171, at 256. These claims exist where patents are infringed only by
aggregating the conduct of more than one actor. Id.
385. Id. Patent law has been designed to deal with the circumstance of unified infringement
by a single actor. But modern commerce is not limited by national boundaries or corporate
forms. Patents written to cover modern technologies are attempting to bring the distributed acts
of different users into the ambit of a territorial legal system that looks for a single infringer. Not
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utility exists in having specialized independent entities carry out
portions of a process: such processes can improve the efficiency,
quality, and profit of any given process. These business realities
increase the number of divided process patents. 386 Additionally, these
business realities also increase the incentive for entities to conduct their
business accordingly by working jointly with others to practice-and
thus infringe-a patented invention.
Breakthrough inventions crucial to many major industries
38 7
contemplate the actions of multiple entities to carry out a process
even if they do not expressly name the actors in the patent claims. This
is especially true within the technology, communication, 38 8 and medical
Further, divided process claims may simply be
industries. 3 89
unavoidable 3 90 due to the nature of modem technology 39 1 and business

For example, in the field of computer and internet
practices.
technologies, patents for processes often must contemplate the actions
of multiple entities, such as users, web servers, and entities supplying
information or services.

3 92

surprisingly, the effort to do so has created significant problems for patent cases. Id.
386. Divided claims generally arise in two different fact patterns: (1) a company/customer fact
pattern where customers perform the final step of a patented process, and (2) a company/company
fact pattern where distinct companies work together to perform a patented process. Gerdelman,
supra note 31, at 2004.
387. Muniauction Petition for en banc Rehearing of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 358, at 14.
388. In the telecommunications industry alone, many issued patents include method claims
which call for steps such as "receiving" and "transmitting" and "displaying" data between remote
locations owned and/or controlled by different entities. Indeed, any claim that requires a
computer monitor or cell phone to be activated by a user, then controlled by a website operator or
carrier also might now be unenforceable against infringers. See Amicus Brief of Production
Resource Group LLC Supporting en banc Rehearing, supra note 166, at 1-6 (discussing method
claims which call for the combined steps of independent entities).
389. The pharmaceutical and technology industries are particularly important because of the
complexity of the state of the art. In these fields especially, the commercially valuable products
and processes are often improvements upon prior patented inventions. Accordingly, the
decreased protection for process patents resulting from BMC could chill innovation in such fields.
390. Muniauction Petition for en banc Rehearing of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 358, at 14.
391. See U.S. Patent No. 6,721,703 (Mar. 2, 2001) (claiming a method of providing remote
deposition services, and contemplating the actions of a court reporter, a deponent, an attorney, a
web server, and an engineer). This invention filled a hole in technology because there existed a
demand in modern legal practices to be able to interview and record witnesses remotely in real
time.
392. For example, patents in the context of computer networks will be unable to avoid divided
claims because of the inherent globality of computer networking. Also in this context, patented
processes may involve some steps performed on the client side and others performed on the
server side. Lemley, supra note 171, at 256. Software claims often must set forth limitations
where multiple parties combine to infringe. Carter, supra note 311, at 831. Furthermore, the
technology contemplated in such patents was not around during the passage of the 1952 Patent
Act. In the BMC case itself, the business realities necessitated that several participants were
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Without judicial recourse, the "direction or control" standard will
render thousands of socially valuable 393 and otherwise valid process
patents unenforceable. 394 For example, several process patents recently
found to be valid and enforceable by the Federal Circuit could now
easily be circumvented by a seller working with a joint venture partner
or customer to whom the seller provides information. 39 5 Nothing would
prevent the growth of entire industries based on the manufacture and
sale of products that partially practice a patented method. As long as
neither purchasers nor manufacturers direct or control the other in its
performance of the patented steps, such conduct would essentially be
lawful even though in every case the patented method is fully
396
practiced.
A drastic repercussion of a patentee's inability to enforce his patent
rights is that he may be unable to recoup the research and development
costs of the invention. 39 7 This situation is highly likely, particularly in
the context of drugs, because the fixed costs of research and
development are very high. 3 98 The marginal costs, however, are very

involved when a pin-less debit bill payment was processed, including the selected ATM network
and the affiliated financial institutions that issued the debit card. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant,
supra note 122, at 44.
393. Innovations in the medical industry have undisputed social value; they cure diseases,
treat sicknesses, and generally provide for the public good. However, under the "direction or
control" standard, many of these patents will be rendered unenforceable. To illustrate, U.S.
Patent No. 6,620,416 claims a method for treatment of HIV, and encompasses a process whereby
a manufacturing lab creates the compound, the dosage is determined based upon the information
provided by the patient, and a doctor administers the drug. This patent could be easily
circumvented because the relationship between the laboratory and physician likely never reaches
one of "direction or control" sufficient under BMC. Thus, an inventor granting an undeniable
innovation to society would nevertheless be given nothing in exchange for his public disclosure.
See MuniauctionPetition for en banc Rehearing of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 358, at 14.
394. Id.
395. In Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharms USA, Inc., the Federal Circuit upheld a finding of
infringement of a process for stabilizing an ACE inhibitor drug by contacting it with: (a) a
suitable amount of an alkali, and (b) one or more saccharides. Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA,
Inc., 518 F.3d 1353, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Two enterprising manufacturers (or a manufacturer
and a sophisticated customer) could coordinate to have one contact the drug with alkalie and the
other contact it with a saccharide, such that neither completed all steps in the patented method.
Muniauction Petition for en banc Rehearing of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 358, at 14-15.
Similarly, Microsoft could easily have evaded the two-code method for software protection
described in z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., by supplying its distributors with software and
codes separately, if the distributors supplied the first authorization code with the software for
retail. Id. at *14-15.
396. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 122, at 43-44.
397. Much drug research fails to generate products that recoup the cost of the research.
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 28, at 315.
398. The high fixed research and development costs of drugs are due in large part to the strict
regulatory requirements imposed by the Food and Drug Administration in order to ensure the
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low, including the marginal costs to infringers. 39 9 As such, competing
infringers would prevent the patent owner from his rightful percentage
of the market share, 40 0 reducing his chances of recouping the expenses
of research alone. An inventor who imparts a benefit on society could
40 1
suffer losses, and in effect be penalized for investing in innovation.
As technology and innovation have adapted to the increased
coordination of independent entities, so too must the patent laws.
Where "it is unlikely in the terms of the realities of the business

situation that any one person or company would itself perform all of the
steps of the claim,"
40 2
liability.

the courts should impose joint infringement

C. Proper Claim DraftingIs an Insufficient Fix
The Federal Circuit's suggestion that unitary claim drafting would
avoid the need to rely on joint infringement is na've at best. 40 3 Unitary
claim drafting is impossible in some instances. 40 4 And the possibility of
avoiding divided infringement problems by redrafting claims is not
40 5
reason to abandon settled principles.

safety and efficacy of drugs. Id. at 314-15.
399. Id. at 297-302.
400. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text (illustrating how the patent owner obtains
a large percentage of the market share as a benefit of his limited monopoly).
401. The purpose of tort liability is to compensate an injured plaintiff and to return him to his
unaffected state before the injurious actions of the defendant. However, in the context of patent
infringement this purpose takes on a double meaning, as a patentee does not merely wish to be

returned to his unaffected state; rather, he was supposed to be granted an economic monopoly in
exchange for public disclosure. Thus, a patent owner that is unable to enforce his exclusive rights
is essentially injured twice: he has lost investments based on research and development of the
patented invention, as well as the limited economic monopoly he was entitled to in exchange for
his public disclosure.
402. Free Standing Stuffer, Inc. v. Holly Dev. Co., 187 U.S.P.Q. 323, 333 (N.D.I111. 1974);
see also Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 122, at 62.
403. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 122, at 46. The Federal Circuit reasoned that the
need to resort to joint infringement is simply the result of bad claim drafting, and can always be
avoided by merely drafting method claims that focus on one entity and whether it supplies or
receives in any given element. Id. at 45-46.
404. See supra note 392 and accompanying text (discussing situations in which drafting
unitary claims would be impossible).
405. Muniauction Petition for en banc Rehearing of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 358, at 14
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40 7
First, patent prosecution 40 6 occurs well before patent litigation.
Permitting infringers to escape liability and eradicating a patentee's
right to exclude based on claim drafting essentially operates
retroactively; the legal principle proscribing ex post facto laws is
relevant in this situation. 40 8 Patent practitioners cannot and should not
be expected to forecast drastic departures in the standards constituting
infringement. 40 9 Further, in light of the inherently precursive nature of
patent prosecution, the Federal Circuit's advice on better claiming is

cold comfort for owners of the many thousands of already-issued
4 10

patents.
Drafting claims from the perspective of a single actor to describe

processes encompassing the actions of multiple participants results in
indirect, passive, and confusing claims. 4 11 This is inconsistent with the
4 12
PTO's clear preference for straightforward and active voice drafting.
406. Patent prosecution is the process by which patent claims are drafted, and then submitted
to the U.S.P.T.O. See DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 29 (discussing patent prosecution).
407. In fact, patent prosecution is the precursor to a patentee obtaining any rights from the
government. Patent prosecution is the process of applying for a patent through the U.S.P.T.O.
and negotiating with the patent examiner. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1258 (8th ed. 2004).
408. The Constitution proscribes ex post facto laws, or laws that apply retroactively, in order
to align with the Constitutional requirement that an actor not be punished without notice. See
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (discussing the ex post facto constitutional prohibitions); see
also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (illustrating that the ex post facto provisions indeed
apply in patent infringement actions). "The limits of a patent must be known for the protection of
the patentee, the encouragement of inventive genius of others, and the assurance that the subject
of the patent will be dedicated ultimately to the public." Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual
Property Owners Association in Support of Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc
at 7, Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 2008 WL 3992446 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 11, 2008) (No.
2007-1485) [hereinafter Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Property Owners Association].
409. Muniauction Petition for en banc Rehearing of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 358, at 14
n.4. Furthermore, putting the onus entirely on the claim drafter ignores the obvious moral hazard
of encouraging gaming of the patent system. Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Property
Owners Association, supra note 408, at 5.
410. Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Property Owners Association, supra note 408, at 5.
411. Id.
412. The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) articulates the laws and regulations
that patent attorneys must follow in filing a patent application with the U.S.P.T.O. Chapter II of
the MPEP states that a patent application must be accompanied by a specification as prescribed
by section 112. UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT
at
2008),
available
(8th
ed.
§
112
PROCEDURE
EXAMINING
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/index.htm. In pertinent part, § 112 requires that:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner
and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains ... to make and use the same..
• The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out
and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (emphasis added). Therefore, during prosecution, patent attorneys are
required to describe the invention in the most clear, concise, and distinct way possible.
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Unitary claim drafting may also be incompatible with the rule that a
patent claim is invalid if it is indefinite 4 13 because such claims could
enlarge the patent's scope beyond its lawful bounds by imposing legal
risks on competitors. 4 14 A close application of BMC would improperly

transform patent drafting into an exercise in semantic gymnastics.4 15
Instead, claims should be drafted to fulfill the purposes of public
4 16
dissemination and enablement.
While it may be possible to draft claims that focus on a single entity,
once the claims are issued they are set in stone as a defined series of

steps. 4 17

However, an infringement analysis does not stop at the

claims-it looks to the elements encompassed in each claim to
determine whether the defendant has practiced every element of the
method.4 18 As such, even if patent claims are "properly ' 4 19 drafted to
focus on one particular entity, it will almost always be possible to
subdivide the performance of the claimed steps between several entities

when the actions of multiple entities are contemplated and inherent to
the process.420 Without liability for joint infringement, every method
patent owner's claims are easily circumvented by the divided
performance loophole, no matter how carefully the patent claims may
42 1
be drafted to cover a single entity.
D. Subsequent Cases FurtherExpanded the "Directionor Control"
413. Claims that are indefinite are invalid. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). See Geneva Pharm., Inc.
v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 349 F.3d 1373, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding a claim invalid for
indefiniteness because it did not clearly disclose the scope of the invention).
414. Indefinite claims would impose legal risks on competitors, who would essentially be
"buying an infringement suit" if they mistook the bounds of a patent because the patent claim was
unclear. Thus, by requiring clear claims, Congress sought to increase competition and innovation
through "inventing around." See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 28, at 324 (discussing how
patent applications economize on description through claims).
415. Muniauction Petition for en banc Rehearing of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 358, at 14
n.4.
416. Section 112 of the Patent Act requires that an invention be described as to enable a
person of ordinary skill in the art to make or use the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
417. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 122, at 46.
418. Prouty v. Draper, Ruggles & Co., 41 U.S. 336, 340 (1842) (setting forth the "all
elements" rule).
419. The drafting technique is described as such only in light of the Federal Circuit's
statement that "[t]he concerns over a party avoiding infringement by arms-length cooperation can
usually be offset by properclaim drafting." BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P. (BMC I1), 498
F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (emphasis added).
420. See NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1317-18 (Fed. Cir.
2005).(distinguishing between a claimed method and a claimed system, in that a method claim is
necessarily formed of individual steps (elements), and implying that each step is performed
somewhat in isolation).
421. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 122, at 46.
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While the BMC opinion implied the requirement of an agency
relationship between entities whose combined action infringed a patent,
it never expressly held as such.4 22 However, subsequent cases have
construed BMC as indeed requiring an agency relationship; thus, these
cases have specifically stated that joint infringement may only be found
where an actor has another party perform steps "on its behalf' 423 such
424
that the relationship rises to the level of vicarious liability.
Therefore, even if the BMC court did not intend to require agency
between entities, it nevertheless set in motion the essential breakdown
of patentee's rights.
In Muniauction Inc. v. Thomson Corp., the Federal Circuit heard a
case addressing infringement of a method for conducting municipal
bond auctions over an electronic network.4 25 The court found that the
auctioneer 4 26 indeed controlled access to its system and instructed
bidders on its use, yet held this was nonetheless insufficient to incur
The court construed BMC's
liability for direct infringement. 4 27
"direction or control" requirement as equivalent to traditional legal
principles of establishing vicarious liability. 4 28 Further, because the
422. See supra note 244 and accompanying text (discussing how the BMC court inferred an
agency relationship requirement between entities whose combined actions infringed a patent).
423. In Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., the court reasoned that because the defendant did
not have "another party perform steps on its behalf .... [i]t does not infringe the asserted claims
as a matter of law." Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
424. "[W]here the relationship between the alleged direct infringer and the third party who
completes performance of the claimed method rises to the level of vicarious liability, direct
infringement can be found." Global Patent Holdings, LLC v. Panthers BRHC LLC, 586 F. Supp.
2d 1331, 1335 (S.D. Fla. 2008), affd 318 Fed. App'x 908 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
425. Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1321. The municipal bond auctions operate as follows: the
municipality issuers offer its bonds to underwriters ("bidders"). Id. The bidders here will
typically bid on the entire bond offering and thereafter re-sell the individual bonds to the public.
Id. at 1322. A bidder submits a price and a related interest rate represented by a coupon for each
of the bonds differentiated by a respective maturity date. Id. The best bid is then determined
according to the true interest cost to the issuer based on the blended rates for each package of the
aggregated submissions made by the bidder. Id. Thus, the claimed method embraces inputting
data from a bidder; automatically computing an interest cost value; submitting the resulting bid
over an electronic network; communicating the bid to the issuer's computer; and displaying the
bid on the issuer's computer. Muniauction Petition for en banc Rehearing of Plaintiff-Appellee,
supra note 358, at 3. The auctioneer's central server controls all steps required for a municipal
bond auction, interfacing with web browsers used by sellers and bidders. Id.
426. The auctioneer was Thomson, the defendant in the matter. Muniauction, 532 F.3d at
1323. The issue presented was whether the action of the defendant auctioneer and the bidders
could be combined under the law so as to give rise to a finding of direct infringement by the
auctioneer. Id.at 1329.
427. Id. at 1330.
428. First, the Federal Circuit applied the BMC standard and language in stating that "[ulnder
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auctioneer did not have another
party perform the other steps "on its
42 9
behalf," liability did not attach.
With deeper analysis, a subsequent district court decision similarly
construed BMC's holding to require an agency relationship where
multiple entities jointly infringe a patent. 4 30 In Global Patent Holdings
LLC v. Panthers BRHC LLC, the claimed method was a Remote Query
Communication System, 4 3 1 which contemplated the action of both
website owners 432 and users. 43 3 The defendant's website supplied
website users with the programs and material with which users could
complete the remaining steps of the process. 434 The patented process
could not begin until the user visited the defendant's website. 4 35 The
court noted that BMC "did not explain with any specificity what it
meant by 'direction or control."' 4 36 However, the court accepted the
Muniauction determination that the standard would be satisfied where
the law would traditionally hold the accused infringer vicariously liable
for the completing party.4 3 7 The court interpreted Muniauction as
merely affirming or clarifying BMC, rather than heightening its
standard.4 3 8 The court concluded that a third party must perform the
steps of the patented process by virtue of a contractual obligation or
BMC Resources then, the issue of infringement in this case turns on whether Thomson
sufficiently controls or directs other parties (e.g., the bidder) such that Thomson itself can be said
to have performed every step of the asserted claims." Id. at 1329. However, in its analysis the
Federal Circuit then stated "[u]nder BMC Resources, the control or direction standard is satisfied
in situations where the law would traditionally hold the accused direct infringer vicariously liable
for the acts committed by another party." Id. at 1330.
429. Id. at 1330.
430. Global Patent Holdings, LLC v. Panthers BRHC LLC, 586 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (S.D. Fla.
2008.
431. The claimed method encompassed downloading responsive data from a remote server,
comprising five enumerated steps. While the defendant website owners did not perform these
steps, the plaintiff alleged that it sufficiently controlled home users. Id. at 1333.
432. The website owner was the named defendant in this matter. Id.
433. The infringement takes place through the joint action of both Defendant and the website
user. Id.
434. The plaintiff alleged that the first step of the patent was controlled by the defendant, even
though it was executed by a remote user's computer, because the user's computer runs the
programs and material that were supplied to the user by the defendant's website. Id.
435. Id. at 1335.
436. Id. at 1334.
437. Id.
438. Citing the Muniauction court's analysis of BMC, the court reasoned that Muniauction
merely "reaffirmed the principle that where the relationship between the alleged direct infringer
and the third party who completes performance of the claimed method rises to the level of
vicarious liability, direct infringement can be found." Id. Therefore, Global Patent Holdings
reasoned that BMC must have intended to require an agency relationship, and that Muniauction
did not constitute a drastic departure therefrom. Id. at 1335.
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other relationship that gives rise to vicarious liability to support a
finding of "direction or control. 4 39 Importantly, the court did not
merely determine that an agency relationship would be sufficient for a
finding of joint liability-an agency relationship was necessary for and
440
dispositive of infringement liability.
The express requirement of an agency relationship between actors
whose combined actions infringe a patent eviscerates the rights of
patentees with divided process claims.4 4 1 Not only is this requirement
dangerous to this specific group of patent owners, it is dangerous to the
integrity of the patent system itself. 4 42 By embracing agency as a
predicate for joint infringement, the unreasonably high standard that a
patent owner must reach is, in many circumstances, very likely
unachievable. 44 3 This standard is unattainable in most instances
because, while defendants may be vicariously liable for actions of
employees and agents, 4 44 under traditional agency principles a party can
never be vicariously liable for customers or joint venture partners. 44 5 In
effect, an agency requirement defines a safe harbor for willful
infringement of process patents. 44 6 For all of the reasons that BMC's
requirement of "direction or control" will have a devastating impact on
the patent system, 4 4 7 an agency requirement will multiply this impact
substantially. 4 48 Even if BMC did not intend to demand an agency
relationship between joint tortfeasors, it set into motion a precedent, the

439. Id.
440. "Without this kind of relationship, the Court does not believe that a finding of 'joint
infringement' is warranted under BMC Resources." Id.
441. "If the decision is allowed to stand, every patentee with a multi-participant proprietary
process will be vulnerable to potential infringers who contract out steps of a patented process by
teaching, instructing, or otherwise directing third parties' complementary actions." Brief of
Amicus Curiae Intellectual Property Owners Association, supra note 408, at 4-5.
442. Id. at 4.
443. See Amicus Brief of Production Resource Group LLC Supporting en banc Rehearing,
supra note 266, at 4 (discussing how the requirement of a formal agency relationship is a likely
unachievable legal standard).
444. A principal is subject to vicarious liability to a third party harmed by an agent's conduct
when the agent is an employee who commits a tort while acting within the scope of employment,
or the agent commits a tort when acting with apparent authority in dealing with a third party on or
purportedly on behalf of the principal. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.03(2) (2006).
445. Muniauction Petition for en banc Rehearing of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 358, at 5.
446. Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Property Owners Association, supra note 408, at 5.
447. See supra Part V.A (discussing how the "direction or control" standard leaves a glaring
loophole in patent law which is inconsistent with patent policy and business realities of modem
society).
448. The agency standard will exacerbate the loss of rights suffered by patent owners, as it is a
much higher standard and thus more difficult to prove. See supra note 443 (arguing that an
agency standard will be unattainable by a process patent owner in most instances).
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debilitating ramifications of which will echo through the patent system
449
contemplated by the very founders of our country.
VI. CONCLUSION
The BMC holding requiring a plaintiff to prove that an infringer
"directs or controls" the other entities who jointly infringe a patented
process amounts to a failure on the part of the Federal Circuit to protect
and enforce the rights of patent owners. The United States Constitution,
Congress, and the judicial system have long recognized the importance
of protecting the patent rights of inventors in order to foster innovation.
Similarly, the great weight of precedent supports imposing liability
when the participation and combined action of multiple entities infringe
a patented process.
The BMC court erred in reasoning that a "direction or control"
standard was necessary. As a result of this erroneous conclusion, the
"direction or control" standard has left a loophole in patent law that
diminishes, and in some cases completely destroys, the exclusive rights
of process patent owners. Patented methods that contemplate the action
of multiple entities are easily circumvented, and judicial enforcement of
these patents is now uncertain at best. The patent system must return to
the quid pro quo contemplated and carefully crafted by the Framers by
granting inventors a meaningful right in exchange for their contribution
to society. Accordingly, joint infringement liability should be imposed
where the participation and combined action of entities infringes a
patent.

449. See supra Part ll.B (discussing the Framer's intent to provide an inventor with an
exclusive fight to exclude).

